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THE PERFECT PROCESS IS THE ENEMY OF THE
GOOD TAX:
TAX'S EXCEPTIONAL REGULATORY PROCESS
Stephanie Hunter McMahon*
Many courts and academics critique existing tax exceptionalism or the
ability of the federal income tax to be created, applied, or interpreted
differently from other laws. Critics have successfully complained that the
Treasury Department, and the IRS as a bureau of the Department, issues
guidance implementing the Internal Revenue Code using different processes
from those required by the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). At the same
time, courts are increasing the level of deference given to this guidance to
conform to that given other agencies. This article responds to these critics by
urging they re-focus their attention on the objectives of administrative law
and comparisons to other agencies' procedures as opposed to limiting their
assessment to the APA. Moreover, this article examines some risks of forcing
procedural uniformity on the tax system. First, the agency would risk being
inundated with information to comply with the APA. The agency could be
captured by those submitting information, be forced to reduce the amount of
guidance it issues, and be thwarted in its ability to accomplish other agency
directives. Second, pushing the agency to develop ex ante regulations
responsive to commentators, including those seeking to use the procedure to
secure personal tax reduction, threatens established heuristics implementing
the complicated Internal Revenue Code. To satisfy the APA's procedures
risks minimizing the agency's use of its expertise to carry out its
congressional-established mission.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Many courts and academics critique tax exceptionalism and disagree that
there is something different or exceptional about the federal income tax.I
Critics often complain that the Treasury Department, and the Internal
Revenue Service (Service) as a bureau of the Department, issues guidance
implementing the Internal Revenue Code using different processes than those
used by other agencies. Its ability to use special processes and have its
guidance respected by the courts may not be long lived. The Supreme Court
recently stated that, absent a justification to do so, it was "not inclined to
carve out an approach to administrative review good for tax law only.',2 The
D.C. Circuit subsequently noted in another case that "[t]he IRS is not special"
with respect to the application of general administrative law.3 Because of its
unique procedures, the Tax Court has held Treasury regulations invalid.4 This
movement to conformity pleases many of the tax professors who have written
on this topic.
Lawrence Zelenak defined tax exceptionalism as "the notion that tax law is somehow
deeply different from other law." Lawrence Zelenak, Maybe Just a Little Bit Special, After
All?, 63 DUKE L.J. 1897, 1901 (2014). There have been several conferences on anti-tax
exceptionalism (ATPI's Tax Law and Administrative Law: The Implications of May
Foundation v. U.S. (2016); Duke Law School's Taking Administrative Law to Tax (2014);
Tax Policy Center's American Corporate Tax Exceptionalism (2009)).
2 Mayo Foundation for Education and Research v. United States, 562 U.S. 44, 55
(2011).
Cohen v. United States, 650 F.3d 717, 723 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (en banc).
4 See e.g., Altera Corp. v. Commissioner,145 T.C. No. 3 (2015).
See infra note 25. Professor Paul Caron, of the TaxProf.blog, once criticized "tax
myopia" and the "myth that tax law is fundamentally different from other areas of law." Paul
Caron, Tax Myopia, or Mamas Don't Let Your Babies Grow Up To Be Tax Lawyers, 13 VA.
TAX REV. 517, 518, 531 (1994).
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Despite this attack on tax exceptionalism, the wide reach of the federal
tax system makes many taxpayers feel there is something unique about it.6 In
2014, over 240 million federal tax returns were filed, of which over 147
million were individual returns.7 Over 118 million individual taxpayers
received refunds, including almost 24.5 million who received refunds
through the earned income tax credit, the largest redistribution program in
the United States.8 Almost 1.4 million returns were audited.9 Compare this
to the 1.34 million active military personnel,' 0 the 963,739 bankruptcy
petitions,' the 376,576 civil and criminal cases filed in the U.S. district
courts,12 the 214,149 total federal inmates. 13 More people interact with the
tax system than with any other part of the federal government. This is not to
minimize the importance of other areas of the federal government but to
underscore the expansive reach of the federal income tax.
Since the federal income tax's enactment in 1913, the number of tax
returns filed annually has increased dramatically. Between 2003 and 2013
alone, the number of individual tax returns was up eleven percent and
business returns up twenty-three percent.1 4 In addition, Congress has added
new initiatives to the Service's burdens, such as implementing national
responses to taxpayer identity theft, monitoring foreign bank accounts and
offshore assets, and administering credits and penalties under the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act.15 Taxpayer questions are to be
answered, tax returns processed, some returns audited, and refunds paid as a
bevy of social, economic, and political policies operate through the tax
6 Zelenak, supra note 1, at 1901.
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, 2014 DATA BOOK, at 4, tbl 2, https://www.irs.gov/pub
/irs-soill 4databk.pdf.
8 Id. at 17, tbl. 7.
9 Id. at 23, tbl. 9a.
1o U.S. DEFENSE MANPOWER DATA CENTER, ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY STRENGTH BY
SERVICE. HISTORICAL REPORTS FY 2013 - 2015, https://www.dmdc.osd.mil/appj/dwp/dwp
reports.Jsp.
II ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF UNITED STATES COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2014,
http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/judicial-business-2014.
12 Id
13 FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS, STATISTICS, https://www.bop.gov/about/statistics
/population statistics.jsp#oldpops (last visited Mar. 19, 2016).
14 Jeremy Temkin, Internal Revenue Service Budget Cuts Spell Trouble, N.Y. L.J. vol
253-no.14 (Jan. 22, 2015) (in nominal terms, the 2005 budget was $10.2 billion and 2015
budget was $10.9 billion).
1IRS Actions to Reduce Improper Payments, Hearings Before the Subcomnm. on Gov't
Operations of the H. Comm. On Oversight and Government Reform, 113th Cong. 61-76 (July
9, 2014) (statement of John A. Koskinen, Commissioner, Internal Revenue Service); 26 U.S.C.
§ 1471 (2012); Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat.
119, 145 (2010).
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system.16
Notwithstanding its importance to the federal government, "[n]o
member of Congress ever got a single vote by telling his constituency that he
got more resources for the IRS."1 The Service's budget has had a twelve
percent reduction over the last ten years when adjusted for inflation, although
the nominal budget has increased modestly.18 Since 2010, there have been
substantial staff reductions in auditing and collection (an 11.9% and 21.4%
decline, respectively).1 9 As it currently operates, the tax system is forced to
do much with little.
In order to facilitate tax filings and the implementation of congressional
initiatives, the Treasury Department issues significant amounts of guidance
to taxpayers and Service personnel. Certainly there remain imperfections in
published tax guidance, but most tax practitioners are pleased with the
guidance that is issued.2 0 "[I]f a regime is designed to give bureaucrats
flexibility and hold them accountable for their results - a management
technique taught in many business schools . . . - then Treasury's
administrative model might seem to be an exemplar rather than a problem."21
Tax guidance is created using a relatively small percentage of
department resources. In its last budget report, the Treasury Department
estimated it spends approximately 3.5% of its enforcement budget issuing
guidance.22 Recently, while using fewer employee hours, the Department has
continued to publish significant amounts of guidance.23 Nevertheless, budget
pressure may threaten the production of guidance even as reduced funding
increases guidance's importance for facilitating accurate tax filings and tax
compliance.2 4
Despite the Treasury Department's success in interpreting the tax on a
16 NATIONAL TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS, at vii-ix (2014).
17 George Guttman, The IRS's Fiscal 2004 Budget: More or Less, 98 TAX NOTES 486,
488 (2003) (quoting Larry Levitan).
18 Temkin, supra note 14.
19 Id
20 See Roundtable on 'Taxes and the Guidance Problem: How to Address the Growing
Problem of Inadequate Guidance, 2011 TNT 142-100 (July 22, 2011); Kristin E. Hickman,
Coloring Outside the Lines: Examining Treasury's (Lack ofi Compliance with Administrative
Procedure Act Rulemaking Requirements, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1727, 1800 (2007).
21 David Zaring, Administration by Treasury, 95 MINN. L. REv. 187, 241 (2010).
22 U.S. DEPT. OF THE TREAS., THE BUDGET IN BRIEF 13-14 (2015),
https://www.treasury.go/about/budget-performance/budget-in-brief/Documents/TreasuryFY
2015_BIB.pdf.
23 Tax Administration: Letting Practitioners Help Write Guidance Poses No More Risk
ofInfluence, TIGTA Says, Daily Tax Rep. (BNA), No. 48 at G-6 (Mar. 12, 2008).
24 Rev. Proc. 2013-32, 2013-28 I.R.B. 55 (restricting the issuance of private letter
rulings).
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limited budget, critics prefer that generally applicable regulatory rules be
imposed more completely on the tax process.25 They complain that "changes
in administrative law doctrine . .. have not penetrated fully into IRS practice
or judicial precedents concerning IRS rules and regulations." 2 6 Professor
Kristin Hickman has been most prolific on this topic, writing that the
Treasury Department fails to comply with the Administrative Procedure Act
27(APA). According to this argument, failing to comply with procedural
requirements should prevent tax guidance from being given the force of law.
However, other scholars argue that "the rules that apply trans-
substantively across the rest of the legal landscape do not, or should not,
apply to tax."a To the extent tax is exceptional, the Treasury Department
requires exceptional procedures to accomplish all that it is tasked with
accomplishing. This argument is consistent with the claim that each
substantive area of law should have different procedures catered to the
agency's mission.2 Professors Ernest Gellhorn and Glen Robinson object to
imposing particular procedures on all agencies because they fear the
misapplication of procedure in different administrative contexts. 30 An
25 See Kristin E. Hickman, Unpacking the Force of Law, 66 VAND. L. REv. 465 (2013);
Kristin E. Hickman, Agency-Specific Precedents, 89 TEx. L. REV 89 (2010); Kristin Hickman,
The Need for Mead, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1537 (2006); Steven R. Johnson, Preserving Fairness
in Tax Administration in the May Era, 32 VA. TAX REV. 269 (2012); Leandra Lederman, The
Fight Over 'Fighting Regs' and Judicial Deference in Tax Litigation, 92 B.U. L. REV. 643
(2012); Shannon Weeks McCormack, Tax Abuse According to Whom?, 15 FLA. TAX REV. I
(2013); Toni Robinson, Retroactivity: The Case for Better Regulation of Federal Tax
Regulators, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 773, 775 (1987). But see Bryan Camp, A History of Tax
Regulation Prior to the Administrative Procedure Act, 63 DUKE L.J. 1673, 1682 (2014);
Richard Murphy, Pragmatic Administrative Law and Tax Exceptionalism, 64 DUKE L.J.
ONLINE 21, 21 (2014); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Which Institution Should Determine Whether an
Agency's Explanation ofa Tax Decision is Adequate?: A Response to Steve Johnson, 64 DUKE
L.J. ONLINE 1, 12 (2014); James Puckett, Structural Tax Exceptionalism, 49 GA. L. REV. 1067
(2015); Zelenak, Maybe Just a Little Bit Special, supra note 1. Professor Zaring notes not only
the Service's exceptionalism but that of the entire Treasury Department (although potentially
comparable to Department of Defense and Department of State). Zaring, Administration by
Treasury, supra note 21, at 238.
26 Richard Levy & Robert Glicksman, Agency-Specific Precedents, 89 TEx. L. REv.499,
500 (2011).
27 Hickman, Agency-Specific Precedents, supra note 25; Kristin E. Hickman, A Problem
of Remedy: Responding to Treasury's (Lack ofi Compliance with Administrative Procedure
Act Rulemaking Requirements, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1153 (2008); Hickman, Coloring
Outside the Lines, supra note 20; Hickman, Unpacking the Force of Law, supra note 25.
28 Zelenak, supra note 1, at 1901.
29 Connor Raso, Agency Avoidance of Rulemaking Procedures, 67 ADMIN. L. REV. 65
(2015); Ernest Gellhorn & Glen 0. Robinson, Perspectives on Administrative Law, 75 COLUM.
L. REV. 771, 787 (1975).
30 Gellhorn & Robinson, supra note 29, at 787-88, 793.
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alternative way to evaluate procedures, according to Professor Ellen Aprill,
is for courts to focus on whether the agency's resulting substantive position
is consistent with what Congress tasked the agency to do.31
Instead of forcing all agencies to conform to one set of principles,
Congress and the courts should figure out which principles work in different
contexts to accomplish administrative law's underlying objectives. Tax has
some notable "atypical features" 32 and no system is perfect, but the Treasury
Department and the Service have developed ways to address many of the
pervasive concerns in administrative law. Though it operates on a relatively
low budget and has little public or congressional support, the tax
administration provides taxpayers a tremendous amount of guidance in
various levels of specificity to facilitate agency consistency and taxpayer
compliance. Examining the process the government uses to create tax
guidance with an eye to the final product, as opposed to comparing the
process to the directives of the APA, provides a better means of evaluating
what the government does correctly and what could be improved.
This article proceeds in three parts. In Part II, the article examines what
is currently known about the Treasury Department's procedures for issuing
tax guidance and what deference courts attribute to that guidance. Many
questions remain to be answered. The Treasury Department's process should
be researched empirically, with comparison to processes used by other
agencies. As a result of incomplete information, this article fails to quantify
the degree to which taxpayers participate in the process or the consideration
the agency gives to input from various groups of taxpayers.
This lack of agency-specific information might explain some of the
critiques of the tax system's procedure. It is easier (although still a
commendable task) to quantify adherence, or the lack thereof, to the
mechanics of the notice and comment process than to assess whether the
guidance-creating process accomplishes underlying policy goals. Courts
have listed many requirements for documentation under notice and comment
that can be verified. However, it is impossible to quantify the value of each
step of the increased process, especially as compared to the undocumented
process that is currently used.
Building on the limited research that is available, Part III analyzes what
critics fail to admit. Critics of the Treasury Department often lambast the
process for creating tax guidance without including in their analysis the
APA's well-known problems and the impact that these problems might have
31 Ellen P. Aprill, Muffled Chevron: Judicial Review of Tax Regulations, 3 FLA. TAX
REv. 51, 87 (1996).
32 Id. at 53; see also Joana Que, Note, The State of Treasury Regulatory Authority, After
Mayo Foundation: Arguing for an Intentionalist Approach at Chevron Step One, 85 S. CAL.
L. REv. 1413 (2012).
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on the creation of tax guidance or the operation of the tax system. By
comparing the tax system's procedures to the APA without a review of the
APA's problems, such as ossification in the creation of guidance, it is
possible critics will make the idea of an impossibly perfect process the enemy
of good tax guidance. In doing so, critics might even thwart seemingly
unrelated congressional objectives by making it impossible for the Treasury
Department to achieve all of its mandates.
In the binary discussion of tax guidance procedures versus the APA,
critics also fail to examine whether the process for creating tax guidance is
exceptional vis-A-vis that used by other agencies. In other words, tax-centric
critics may be holding tax to a uniquely high standard. Instead of critiquing
tax as an isolated area of law, tax scholars should integrate federal taxation
into larger administrative debates. It is insufficient to merely incorporate
broad administrative overviews into a tax analysis. Failing to challenge or
add to existing theory denies administrative law the opportunity of seeing tax
procedures as an alternative. Moreover, it fails to prevent the problems
identified in administrative law from being imported into the tax system.
Dean Erwin Griswold wrote in the 1940s, "It is high time that tax lawyers
rise up to defend themselves against the charge that tax work is narrowing
and stifling."3 3 Tax has much expertise to offer other areas of law, including
its rather nimble creation of guidance.
Part IV discusses two specific challenges that the Treasury Department
is able to overcome using the current process of tax guidance formation.
These benefits are at risk of being lost through a standardization of process.
First, tax guidance faces many attempts at information capture by which
interested parties may purposely (or not) control the content of regulatory
guidance. The theory of information capture suggests wealthy and organized
taxpayers could gain an advantage in the creation of favorable tax guidance
by flooding the Treasury Department with information. The Department must
filter massive amounts of information to create fair guidance.
Although more input from the poor and other relatively less organized
groups is needed, the Treasury Department demonstrates some means of
filtering information and balancing views despite a widespread perception
that tax is too complex for anyone to understand. Attempting to increase
participation at the cost of a more formalized process might result in reduced
or less meaningful participation from those who are currently least likely to
participate in tax discussions. Focusing on the goal of balanced participation
leads to different solutions than focusing on the APA.
Second, tax currently operates with reasonable heuristics, or rules of
thumb, that guide revenue agents, taxpayers, and courts to interpret
Erwin N. Griswold, The Need for a Court of Tax Appeals, 57 HARv. L. REv. 1153,
1183 (1944).
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complicated tax statutes. These heuristics are necessary because, despite the
Code being a complex statute that creates a complex regime, it fails to
provide specific guidance for every circumstance. Congress vests significant
discretion in the Treasury Department to administer the system, and one
means of construing that discretion is through the use of heuristics that
facilitate decision-making.
Increasing procedure would require the Treasury Department to exercise
its discretion before the application of the law, nullifying one of the Treasury
Department's strengths. Responding to comments that would almost
certainly have the goal of tax minimization through explicit rules that can be
planned around would threaten the heuristics that can counteract tax
planning. Instead of procedure-laden, complex rules, rules of thumb have
historically helped the system function and allowed the government to
respond to changing laws and taxpayer activities.
Part V concludes that to the extent the processes used to create tax
guidance accomplish the goals of administrative law, its exceptionalism
offers a way of producing guidance without some of the problems associated
with compliance with the APA. Congress and courts should be wary of
importing procedures from other areas of law into the tax system unless they
are prepared to incorporate imperfections, which may be worse than the
problems tax already suffers. It may be unpopular to argue that the Service is
doing something right, but, with respect to the issuance of tax guidance, the
Service's good is better than the less exceptional alternative.
II. THE CURRENT PROCESS
Congress is responsible for creating the Internal Revenue Code, which
the president signs into law, but it falls to the Treasury Department to
interpret and apply the statute in the first instance. The Treasury Department,
and the Service within it, creates a regime that must be used by hundreds of
millions of taxpayers. They create this regime through regulations and other
guidance that either explains or supplements the Code. Once made, this
guidance is granted varying levels of deference by the courts. Both the
creation of tax guidance and the deference given it are subject to
exceptionalism critiques that, if successful, would limit its creation or
application to taxpayers.
A. Creating Tax Guidance
The Treasury Department and the Service issue numerous forms of tax
guidance, and there are different procedures for the creation of each type.
Only broad outlines of those procedures are made public, but it is clear that
Treasury Department procedures receive varying amounts of internal and
external review. These procedures developed not out of the agency's
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founding statute but from a need to provide information to Service employees
and the public. Because the Treasury Department is a large organization with
many functions, not everything that is produced is given extensive review.
This longstanding Treasury Department practice favoring the prompt
creation of guidance predates the APA and has continued even after changes
in general administrative law.34
Treasury regulations are the most authoritative form of tax guidance but,
nonetheless, only skeletal outlines are available for how they are developed
or even how issues are targeted for guidance. Under current procedures, the
Service annually solicits taxpayer input as to what guidance is most needed.
However the process by which the Assistant Secretary of Tax Policy puts
those proposals into a semiannual agenda is not described. And new
legislation or events might change listed priorities on the agenda without
notice. During his extensive career as a tax attorney and at accounting firms,
Phillip Gall noted that how and why projects appear on that list is "somewhat
mysterious.,36 This may be in, in part, because for much of the last decade,
there was no confirmed Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy to guide this
process.37 After being placed on the agenda, initiated projects are assigned to
the Office of the Chief Counsel of the Internal Revenue Service, effectively
the Service's internal law firm, to being the drafting process.
The public may be alerted to the agency's interpretation of an issue at
different times in the drafting process. Early in the rulemaking process, the
Treasury Department may issue an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking.
Such a notice describes a problem or situation about which the agency is
considering issuing published guidance, describes the anticipated approach,
and solicits public feedback on that approach. 39 Whether or not an Advance
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking is issued, a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
announces proposed regulations published in the Code of Federal
3 Levy & Glicksman, supra note 26, at 554.
3 Transcript Available of Tax Analysts' Roundtable on *Taxes and the Guidance
Problem,' 2011 TNT 142-100 (Jul. 22, 201 1): Tax Administration: Letting Practitioners Help
Write Guidance Poses No More Risk of Influence, TIGTA Says, Daily Tax Rep. (BNA), No.
48 at G-6 (Mar. 12, 2008). In the 1950s, the Assistant Secretary to Treasury explained then-
current procedures. See Laurens Williams, Preparation and Promulgation of Treasury
Department Regulations Under Internal Revenue Code of 1954, in 8 MAJOR TAX PLANNING
733, 748-50 (1956).
36 Phillip Gall, Phantom Tax Regulations: The Curse of Spurned Delegations, 56 TAX
LAw. 413, 416 (2003).
3 Amy S. Elliott, Roundtable Panelists Bemoan Tax Guidance Processes, 132 TAX
NOTEs 473 (2011).
38 Treas. Reg. § 601.601(a)(1).
I.R.M. 32.1.1.2.1 (Sept. 23, 2011).
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Regulations with draft language. 4 0
The method by which proposed regulatory language is drafted is
described in the Service's Internal Revenue Manual.41 A drafter and a
reviewer from the same Office of Chief Counsel that created the regulatory
agenda and an attorney from the Treasury Department Office of Tax Policy
(the agency that establishes policy criteria) consider projects slated for
regulations. These three, possibly joined by others, jointly identify issues,
informally exchange drafts of regulations, and hold guidance briefings as
needed. Before being proposed to the public, the draft language is submitted
to various constituents within the Treasury Department in order to build
widespread internal acceptance of its content.42 Only when the language
reaches the highest level of internal review is input received from outside the
Department, the executive's Office of Management and Budget.43 If the
Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy signs off on the proposed language, it
becomes a proposed regulation ready to be published and sent to the Service.
This first internal step takes anywhere from months to years.44
Once published in proposed form, the group of drafters solicits public
comments. According to the Internal Revenue Manual, although the public
may voice its opinion on regulatory topics at any time, the public is not to see
the draft language until a proposed regulation is released and comments
publicly solicited. The public may then comment in writing via the notice and
comment process, but only if that process is available. 4 5 This is the only
official time the Department receives feedback on regulations from taxpayers
. 46
or their representatives.
Notwithstanding this formal process, many scholars argue that the
majority of comments received on tax regulations are informal and delivered
40 I.R.M. 32.1.1.2.2 (Sept. 23, 2011).
41 I.R.M. 32.1.1 (Sept. 23, 2011); see also MICHAEL SALTZMAN & LESLIE BOOK, IRS
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE T3.02[2] (2016); Michael Asimow, Public Participation in the
Adoption of Temporary Tax Regulations, 44 TAX LAw 343, 366-68 (1991); Gall, supra note
36, at 416; Monte A. Jackel, Is There Anything Wrong With the Guidance Process?, 132 TAX
NOTES 935 (2011); Williams, supra note 35, at 748-50.
42 Transcript Available of Tax Analysts' Roundtable on 'Taxes and the Guidance
Problem' 2011 TNT 142-100 (Jul. 22, 2011), at 7-12 (remarks by Mike Desmond).
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 I.R.M. 32.1.7.2 (Aug. 19, 2011).
46 There are other, less-participatory means of rulemaking not used in the tax area. Direct
final rulemaking permits the agency to publish a rule and then solicit public feedback; if
objections are received the rule is normally withdrawn and submitted for notice and comment.
See Ronald M. Levin, Direct Final Rulemaking, 64 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1 (1995); Ronald M.
Levin, More on Direct Final Rulemaking: Streamlining, Not Corner-Cutting, 51 ADMIN. L.
REv. 757 (1999). But see Lars Noah, Doubts about Direct Final Rulemaking, 51 ADMIN L.
REv. 401 (1999).
[Vol. 35:553562
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over the phone, seemingly violating the process outlined in the Internal
Revenue Manual. 47 Without describing the public's involvement in detail,
Professor Wendy Wagner states that most administrative agencies give
interest groups extensive influence before notice and comment begins
because agencies are aware that they must work closely with potential critics
for rules to make it through the process.48 It is clear that more information
needs to be obtained regarding the amount and timing of public involvement
that exists, especially informally, in the creation of tax guidance.
After the public comment period has lapsed, the group within the
Treasury Department that proposed the regulation drafts issues memoranda
summarizing the issues.4 9 Assuming no major changes are required in
response to comments, the group also prepares final regulations. The
Commissioner (or Deputy Commissioner) of the Service and an Assistant
Secretary (or Deputy Assistant) for Tax Policy sign the final proposal. If
major changes are required, the process may begin again with another notice
and comment period.
One concern with this process is that it is slow.50 There are complaints
about the lack of staffing and funding for those who draft and review
regulations, as is undoubtedly common throughout the government; and the
complaint regarding tax guidance is often that "being 'cheap' at the front end
results in much more cost at the back end." 5 ' Cost does constrain the issuance
of guidance. For example, the Service recently announced it is restricting the
issuance of one type of guidance in order to conserve agency resources.52
Using this process, regulations can be initiated for any tax provision.
Procedure may depend upon which provision is the source of authority for
their issuance. Unlike other areas of law, tax persists in distinguishing
between specific and general regulatory authority for guidance. This
exceptionalism perseveres although the Code is not the only statutory system
with both forms of authority.53
Although the source of authority for particular regulations may have
Asimow, Public Participation, supra note 41. at 366 n.104. Hickman, A Problem of
Remedy, supra note 27, at 1205. Would commentators provide less of this free service if they
needed to submit written documentation rather than just lift the phone?
48 Wendy Wagner, Administrative Law, Filter Failure, and Information Capture, 59
DUKE L.J. 1321, 1381-83 (2010).
49 I.R.M. 32.1.8.6 (Aug. 11, 2004).
50 Jackel, supra note 41, at 936.
s1 Id. at 935.
52 Rev. Proc. 2013-32, 2013-28 I.R.B. I (restricting the issuance of private letter
rulings).
5 See, e.g., Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, § 220, 48 Stat. 1067,
1068, 1078-80; Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-22, § 10(b)(4). 48 Stat. 74, 81
(containing both specific and general rulemaking authority).
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little impact on the content of the final guidance, the Treasury Department
maintains that it is important to link guidance back to the source of authority.
As a broad grant of general regulatory authority, section 7805(a) gives the
Treasury Department the power to develop "all needful rules and regulations
for the enforcement of' the Code. 5 4 Additionally, some Code sections grant
extremely broad specific authority. For example, section 1502 provides the
Treasury Department the authority to develop whatever regulations are
necessary to ensure affiliated corporations' returns properly reflect income,
and the regulations under section 1502 have become a web of law in their
own right.5 5 Finally, there are narrowly tailored specific delegations of
authority that give the Department greater guidance as to Congress's desires.
For example, section 168(i)(5) calls for regulations to guide the
determination of depreciation deductions with respect to tangible property if
the property changes status during the year.
One reason the source of authority is considered important is that the
Treasury Department contends guidance issued under general authority
demands less formal procedures for its creation. Under the APA, regulations
may be categorized as either legislative or interpretive,5 7 and the Treasury
Department often traces this classification to the source of authority.
Legislative regulations provide operational rules for specific Code provisions
and have the same authority as the law itself. The Treasury Department's
position is that legislative regulations normally originate from specific
authority.5 8 On the other hand, interpretive regulations merely explain the
government's position and, according to the Treasury Department, are issued
under general authority. 59 Because the latter type of regulations merely
interprets the law, instead of making it, the Treasury Department argues that
these regulations are not subject to the same stringent procedural
requirements as the former. Despite the importance of distinguishing between
legislative and interpretive guidance, all administrative agencies find it
difficult to draw the distinction.60
Congress is aware, at least in some instances, that the Treasury
Department retains this distinction between authorities and procedures.
Pursuant to the Regulatory Flexibility Analysis Act (FRAA),61 agencies must
1.R.C. § 7805(a) (2016).
Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-0 through 1.1502-100.
56 I.R.C. § 168(i)(5) (2016).
5 U.S.C. § 553; see also supra note 28.
58 I.R.M. 32.1.1.2.8 (Sept. 23, 2011).
5 Id.
6o Camp argues that all early regulations were considered interpretive. Camp, supra note
25, at 1709-10.
61 5 U.S.C. § 603(a) (2012).
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analyze the impact of proposed rules on small businesses. The requirement
generally applies only to rules that go through the APA's notice-and-
comment procedures, which the Treasury Department contends only applies
to specific authority or legislative regulations. Congress added a special
requirement to the FRAA applicable only to tax to include interpretive rules
as well as legislative ones.62 In doing so, Congress recognized that the
Treasury Department makes a distinction and chose to override that
distinction for a limited purpose without eliminating it.
Nevertheless, critics contend the Treasury Department's distinction
between general and specific authority and, therefore, legislative and
interpretive guidance should no longer apply. 63 Focusing on the potential
penalties taxpayers face if they fail to follow interpretive regulations,
Professor Kristin Hickman argues the distinction reflects a historical
understanding no longer consistent with changes in administrative law
doctrine, which push toward greater procedure for regulations.64 According
to this argument, all tax regulations need more arduous public review.
Permitting the Treasury Department to maintain this distinction allows the
Department to create law without undertaking the procedural steps required
to do so. This also raises questions of agency overreaching. When the
Treasury Department claims general authority as its basis for regulations,
there is increased risk the Department creates guidance beyond the will of
Congress and without a specific congressional mandate to do so.65
In addition to deriving from different legal bases, tax regulations also
come in three different forms: final, temporary, and proposed. Final
regulations are the most authoritative and have completed all internal and
external review. Proposed regulations are those that have completed internal
review but have not yet completed the public's review. Proposed regulations
provide insight into how the Service interprets the law. Taxpayers cannot rely
on proposed regulations to support a tax position or for planning purposes
unless the Service clearly states otherwise, and proposed regulations are not
62 Id. (The requirement applies to a general notice of proposed rulemaking or a "notice
of proposed rulemaking for an interpretative rule involving the internal revenue laws of the
United States .... ).
63 Asimow, Public Participation, supra note 41, at 357-58; Steve Johnson,
Intermountain and the Importance of Administrative Law in Tax Law, 128 TAX NOTES 837
(2010).
64 Richard E. Levy & Robert L. Glicksman, Agency-Specific Precedents, 89 TEX. L.
REv. 499, 520 (2011).
65 With increased procedure, there may be hope for judicial intervention against
Treasury Department overreach, but that is limited by standing and pre-enforcement litigation
restrictions. Mark E. Berg, Judicial Deference to Tax Regulations: A Reconsideration in Light




binding on the Service, even though the Service's policy is to follow them.66
Finally, temporary regulations are issued simultaneously with proposed
regulations.67 Temporary regulations have the same authority as final
regulations despite rarely going through notice and comment.68
It is temporary regulation's combination of speedy publication without
public review that subjects this form of regulations to criticism but makes the
form popular with the Treasury Department.69 And they are pervasive. The
Treasury Department has issued a significant number of temporary
regulations since a backlog of statutes needing guidance was enacted in the
1980s.70 In a study of 232 regulatory projects, from January 1, 2003 through
December 31, 2005, more than one-third were issued with only post-
promulgation notice and comment.71 The Treasury Department claimed more
than 90 percent of these were interpretive and that public comment was not
required.72 Some complain that temporary regulations' lack of procedure
"obliterates the APA's notice-and-comment procedures."n In 1991,
Professor Michael Asimow predicted "the inevitable waive of litigation"
about the validity of temporary regulations that has yet to occur.74
By law, temporary regulations are only effective for three years,75
requiring the Treasury Department to finalize these regulations or they lose
their authority. Despite current procedures, a question remains whether
temporary regulations also need the same process of ex ante public comment
as final regulations. The Treasury Department has argued, unsuccessfully,
66 I.R.M. 32.1.1.2.2 (Sept. 23, 2011); I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. CC-2003-014 (May 8,
2003).
67 Section 7805(e) of the Code requires the Treasury Department to issue proposed
regulations when it issues temporary regulations, and proposed regulations presumably are
subject to notice and comment. I.R.M. 32.1.1.2.2 (Sept. 23, 2011).
68 I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. CC-2003-014 (May 8, 2003).
69 See Asimow, Public Participation, supra note 41, at 363-64; Johnson, Intermountain,
supra note 63, at 838; Kristin Hickman & Mark Thomson, Open Minds and Harmless Errors:
Judicial Review of Post-Promulgation Notice and Comment, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 216, 282
(2016); Hickman, Unpacking the Force of Law, supra note 25, at 496 n. 168; Juan F. Vasquez,
Jr. & Peter A. Lowy, Challenging Temporary Regulations: An Analysis of the Administrative
Procedure Act, Legislative Reenactment Doctrine, Deference, and Invalidity, 3 Hous. Bus. &
TAx L.J. 248, 253 (2003). One can think of temporary regulations as either (1) a prelude to a
final regulation or (2) as permitting the parties to see potential problems, debate solutions, and
mitigate the problems.
70 Asimow, Public Participation, supra note 41, at 343; Hickman, Unpacking the Force
of Law, supra note 25, at 498.
71 Hickman, Coloring Outside the Lines, supra note 27, at 1748-51.
72 Id
Vasquez & Lowy, Challenging Temporary Regulations, supra note 69, at 253.
74 Asimow, Public Participation, supra note 41, at 370.
7 I.R.C. § 7805(e).
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that Congress provided the short period of effectiveness and required the
simultaneous issuance of proposed regulations as a political trade off
permitting the continued, shorter-term use of temporary regulations without
notice and comment.76 According to this interpretation, Congress authorized
a tax-specific exception to notice-and-comment for temporary regulations for
three years.7
It is plausible, but unproven, that Congress was aware of the backlog of
statutes and taxpayers' desire for guidance and expected the Treasury
Department to continue issuing temporary legislative regulations but with
post-promulgation notice and comment. If that was the case, Congress did
not say so, and Congress has been explicit about trade-offs in other contexts.
For example, Congress explicitly permitted regulations with post-
promulgation comments with respect to the Health Care Portability and
Accountability Act of 1996.78
Even with the existence of proposed and temporary regulations,
regulations are not written for every statute that requires them. Guidance
projects may "linger or die" as a result of changes in Treasury Department
personnel or the project's politicization. The Treasury Department's failure
to issue regulations, when given a congressional mandate to do so, can be as
deleterious as drafting inappropriate regulations. When Congress delegates
specific authority to the Treasury Department to issue regulations but
regulations are not forthcoming, courts may be forced to invoke phantom
regulations as though some form of regulation had been issued in order to
apply the law.8 1
The issue of phantom regulations is not without debate. The Tax Court
once concluded that "the Secretary may not prevent implementation of a tax
benefit provision simply by failing to issue regulations." 82 The alternative
would give the Treasury Department the power to defeat a congressionally-
mandated tax provision "merely by failing to discharge the statutorily
76 Intermountain Ins. Serv. of Vail, LLC v. Commissioner, 134 T.C. 211, 245 (2010),
rev'don other grounds, 650 F.3d 691 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
n Id. at 245-46. Judges Halpern and Holmes of the Tax Court rejected this
interpretation.
78 I.R.C. § 9833, Pub. L. No. 04-191, title IV, § 401(a) (1996).
7 Jackel, supra note 41, at 936 .
so See Michael Livermore & Richard Revesz, Regulatory Review, Capture, andAgency
Inaction, 101 GEO. L.J. 1337, 1341 (2013).
But see Temsco Helicopters, Inc. v. United States, 409 Fed. Appx. 64, 67-68 (2010);
Francisco v. Commissioner, 119 T.C. 317, 322-23 (2002), aff'd, 370 F.3d 1228 (D.C. Cir.
2005); Hillman v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 103, 110 (2000); Estate of Neumann v.
Commissioner, 106 T.C. 216, 220-21 (1996).
82 Francisco, 119 T.C. at 324.
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imposed duty to promulgate the required regulations."83 Courts can also seek
to compel the creation of regulations but, with limited agency resources, only
so much can practically be done.
As the Treasury Department fails to issue all requisite regulations, the
Service issues many other forms of guidance that are made public as a result
of the Freedom of Information Act.84 These other forms of tax guidance are
given less high-level internal evaluation and often lack formalized external
review. Revenue Rulings are public administrative rulings that apply to
particular factual situations. Revenue Procedures are akin to Revenue
Rulings but traditionally focus on procedural, rather than substantive, aspects
of the tax system. Public notices are viewed by the Service as equivalent to
rulings but tend to be issued more quickly in response to public concerns.85
Less general are private letter rulings issued to particular taxpayers seeking
binding guidance for proposed transactions and numerous types of guidance
issued to Service agents in the process of audits or on particular matters.
It is one of the latter, less general forms of guidance that incorporates the
greatest amount of taxpayer information in its creation and is currently
threatened by budget cuts.86 When a taxpayer requests a private letter ruling,
the taxpayer begins an extensive dialogue with the Service as the taxpayer
must provide satisfactory information to receive the ruling. This dialogue
is necessary because these rulings function akin to an audit prior to the
submission of a tax return. Although it is not necessarily indicative of
taxpayer involvement in the creation of other guidance and it is only binding
on the Service and the taxpayer making the request, private letter rulings
illustrate departmental capacity for interpreting information received from
taxpayers.
Historically, there has been little complaint from practitioners about any
of the forms of tax guidance, particularly on procedural grounds. "Most
members of the tax community believe that Treasury does a decent job in
drafting regulations and instead focus their grumbling on issues where
guidance is lacking."8 8 With respect to Treasury Department and Service
guidance, Linda Stiff, Managing Director with PricewaterhouseCoopers and
former Acting Commissioner of the Service, stated, "I personally believe that
the process is neither fundamentally or [sic] inherently bad or [sic] failed or
Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. 819, 829 (1984); see also Int'l
Multifoods Corp. v. Commissioner, 108 T.C. 579, 587 (1997).
84 John F. Coverdale, Court Review of Tax Regulations and Revenue Rulings in the
Chevron Era, 64 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 35, 51-52 (1995).
85 Rev. Rul. 87-138, 1987-2 C.B. 287.
86 See Rev. Proc. 2013-32, 2013-28 I.R.B. 1.
87 I.R.M. 32.3.2 (Jul. 9, 2014); Rev. Proc. 2015-1, 2015-7 I.R.B. 1.
88 Hickman, Coloring Outside the Lines, supra note 27, at 1800.
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[sic] completely ineffective as I've heard some say." 89 That sense may be
changing. Professor Hickman argues that the reason for the past failure to
complain stemmed not from not a rational ignorance of administrative law or
a love for the guidance itself but from procedural limitations as to what a
taxpayer may gain from such a challenge. Those limits reduce taxpayers'
desire to bring procedural suits. 90
Unlike with other agencies, public challenges to (as opposed to
comments on) tax guidance are explicitly limited. Almost all legal challenges
to tax guidance are deferred until after a taxpayer is audited, is found to owe
tax, and has completed the agency's appeals process. The source of this bar
is, first, the Tax Anti-Injunction Act and the Declaratory Judgment Act that
isolate Treasury Department rules from pre-enforcement challenges, whether
on substantive or procedural grounds. The Anti-Injunction Act denies
injunctive relief by generally prohibiting "suit for the purpose of restraining
the assessment or collection of any tax . . . whether or not such person is the
person against whom such tax was assessed."91 The Declaratory Judgment
Act contains a tax exception that prevents courts from providing pre-
enforcement declaratory relief for controversies "with respect to Federal
taxes." 92
Courts have interpreted the Tax Anti-Injunction Act and the Declaratory
Judgment Act coextensively93 and broadly.94 Neither provision's legislative
history provides much evidence of congressional intent,95 but the Supreme
89 Transcript Available of Tax Analysts' Roundtable on 'Taxes and the Guidance
Problem,' 2011 TNT 142-100 (Jul. 22. 2011).
90 lickman, Agency-Specific Precedents, supra note 25; Hickman, A Problem of
Remedy, supra note 27, at 1156.
91 See Ellen Aprill, The Impact of Agency Procedures and Judicial Review on Tax
Refbrms, 65 NAT'L TAX J. 917 (2012); Paul H. Asofsky, Injunctions and Declaratory
Judgments in Federal Tax Controversies, 28 RUTGERS L. REv. 785, 786 (1975); Hickman, A
Problem of Remedy, supra note 27, at 1165-81; James Lenoir, Congressional Control over
Suits to Restrain the Assessment or Collection of Federal Taxes, 3 ARIz. L. REV. 177 (1961);
Richard Murphy, Pragmatic Administrative Law and Tax Exceptionalism, 64 DUKE L.J.
ONLINE 21, 23 (2014); Gale Ann Norton, The Limitless Federal Taxing Power, 8 HARV. J.L.
& PUB. PoL'Y 591, 622-23 (1985). The Supreme Court has not declared that cases regarding
procedural rules cannot be litigated pre-enforcement. Hickman, Agency-Specific Precedents,
supra note 25, at 99-100. Scholars note two common law exceptions that permit litigation but
generally find the exceptions insufficient. lickman, A Problem of Remedy, supra note 27, at
1169-73.
92 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (2012).
9 Hickman, A Problem ofRemedy, supra note 27, at 1166.
94 Id. at 167. As a specific enactment, § 7421 trumps the APA as a general statute.
95 Paul H. Asofsky, Injunctions and Declaratory Judgments in Federal Tax
Controversies, 28 RUTGERS L. REV. 785, 787-88 (1975); Note, Enjoining the Assessment and
Collection ofFederal Taxes Despite Statutory Prohibition, 49 HARv. L. REV. 109, 109 (1935).
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Court often identifies a revenue-raising function.96 As a result, these statutes
often prevent pre-enforcement legal challenge to tax statutes and, therefore,
are likely to increase government revenue. Even when injunction and
declaratory judgment actions occur, they are rarely successful. 9 7
Recently, the Supreme Court circumvented these limitations on pre-
enforcement litigation in a way that might reduce tax's exceptionalism in the
future. A case regarding the individual mandate in the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act of 2010 seemed to present a conflict between the penalty
as a tax to establish its constitutional basis and as a tax for these statutory
prohibitions on pre-enforcement litigation.98 Two former Service
commissioners, Mortimer Caplin and Sheldon Cohen, filed an amici curiae
brief arguing the Anti-Injunction Act and Declaratory Judgment Act
prevented pre-enforcement judicial review of the mandate.99 Nevertheless,
the Supreme Court distinguished between a "tax" for statutory and
constitutional purposes, denying the application of the Anti-Injunction Act
and the Declaratory Judgment Act.100
Similarly, the Circuit Court narrowed its reading of these limitations in
Cohen v. United States.101 The Supreme Court has denied certiorari, leaving
the precedent in the Circuit Court of allowing pre-enforcement litigation
when several taxpayers challenged special refund procedures from an
invalidated telephone excise tax. The Service had issued those refund
procedures in Notice 2006-50 without notice and comment.102 The taxpayers
did not request a refund but challenged the Notice under with the APA.
Narrowly reading the Anti-Injunction Act as not covering refunds, the court
refused to create a broader tax exception from the challenges allowed by the
APA.103 Arguing for administrative law uniformity, the D.C. Circuit's
majority concluded "[t]he IRS is not special in this regard; no exception
exists shielding it - unlike the rest of the Federal Government - from suit
under the APA."1 04 The court permitted the challenge and, on remand, the
District Court determined the notice was invalid per the APA. 0 5
96 Enochs v. Williams Packing & Navigation Co., 370 U.S. 1, 7 (1962).
97 Asofsky, supra note 95, at 786.
98 Steve R. Johnson, TheAnti-Injunction Act andtheindividual Mandate, 135 Tax Notes
1395 (Dec. 12, 2011).
99 Id
100 Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S.Ct. 2566 (2012).
101 Cohen v. United States, 650 F.3d 717 (D.C. Cir. 2011), cert. denied 135 S.Ct. 946
(2015).
102 I.R.S. Notice 2006-50, 2006-25 1.R.B. 1141.
103 Cohen, 650 F.3d at, at 723-24 (holding that § 702 of the APA waives sovereign
immunity for APA procedural challenges).
104 Id. at 723.
1os In re Long-Distance Tel. Service Fed. Excise Tax Refund Litig., 853 F.Supp.2d 138
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In addition to these statutory limitations, common law sovereign
immunity and standing doctrine discourage or prohibit most pre-enforcement
tax challenges, although these common law limitations are also under
challenge.io6 Justiciability doctrines, such as standing and ripeness,
complicate the prospects for tax litigation, even though these have been
infrequently raised in the tax context because of the statutes described
above.1 07 Standing is more generally a problem for third parties seeking
judicial action against Service guidance that is intended to apply to other
taxpayers. os Cases on these common law limits are rare.
Notwithstanding the timing restrictions for procedural challenges to tax
guidance, courts appear increasingly sympathetic to them. In Dominion
Resources Inc. v. United States,109 the Federal Circuit invalidated a
regulation governing the capitalization of interest (as opposed to its current
deductibility) on the grounds that it was not a reasonable interpretation of the
statute. 10 It troubled the court that the regulation was premised on a fiction
that about the inability to sell component parts of a larger item. Not basing
its decision on its evaluation of the fiction, the court concluded the regulation
was arbitrary and capricious because the promulgation of the regulation did
not have the judicially mandated reasoned explanation of the Treasury
Department's decision-making.II From the tone of the opinion, it is unlikely
any explanation would have satisfied the majority who disliked the particular
fiction on which the regulations were based, even though the concurrence
pointed out some fiction was likely inevitable.
(D.D.C. 2012). The case potentially opens the Treasury Department to significant, although
not unlimited, litigation because it narrowly reads the Anti-Injunction Act's limitation as not
involving the refund of taxes already collected. The practical result was that the Service did
not create new procedures through notice and comment and the statute of limitations has
closed for taxpayers who could be affected.
106 Patrick Smith, Standing Issues in Direct APA Challenges to Tax Regulations, 149 TAX
NorES 1033 (Nov. 23, 2015).
107 Karl Coplan, Ideological Plainijfs, Administrative Lawmaking, Standing, and the
Petition Clause, 61 ME. L. REv. 377 (2009); Hickman, A Problem of Remedy, supra note 27,
at 1174-76; Lynn Lu, Standing in the Shadow of Tax Exceptionalism, 66 ADMIN. L. REV. 73
(2014); Elizabeth Magill, Standing Jbr the Public, 95 VA. L. REv. 1131 (2009); Richard
Stewart, Standingfor Solidarity, 88 YALE L.J. 1559, 1568 (1979).
os 1Hickman, A Problem of Remedy, supra note 27, at 1175. The case-or-controversy
requirement of Article III of the Constitution requires litigants to show an "injury in fact,"
casuation, and redressability. Id. at 1175-76. Ripeness requires that the issue be fit for judicial
decision and that the parties experience hardship absent court consideration. Id at 1179.
109 Dominion Resources Inc. v. United States, 681 F.3d 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2012). For a
discussion of this case, see Aprill, Impact ofAgency Procedures, supra note 91, at 923.
110 Treas. Reg. 1.263A-l l(e)(1)(ii)(B) (1995).
" Dominion Resources, Inc, 681 F.3d at 1319. These problems existed before, but not
as often. See American Standard, Inc. v. United States, 602 F.2d 256, 267 (Ct. Cl. 1979).
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And in Altera Corp. v. Commissioner, a unanimous Tax Court invalided
certain transfer pricing regulations used by multi-national corporations.'112
When issuing the final regulations, the Treasury Department's files did not
contain expert opinions, empirical data, or papers that supported its position,
and its preamble, while responding to some comments, was held not to justify
the final rule. Invalidating the regulations, the Tax Court disagreed with the
Treasury Department that the APA did not apply and found the Treasury
Department failed to engage in reasoned decision-making by not producing
this evidence and not responding to several comments. As a result, the
Treasury Department was found to have engaged in arbitrary and capricious
decision-making.
Arguments against tax guidance's procedural exceptionalism are likely
to continue. On the basis that the Code's general authority has the force of
law and are, therefore, legislative, courts are likely to require the Treasury
Department to follow notice and comment procedures absent an exemption.
The result, however, is unlikely to be widespread invalidation of regulations.
Under existing law, these regulations would likely, although not definitively,
be remanded without vacatur. 13 Nevertheless, even with additional time to
comply with procedure, additional process for all tax guidance would
threaten agency administration.
B. Deference thereto
Courts have devoted significant attention to the question of the
appropriate level of deference to be given to agency-created guidance.114
They have a long history of deferring to agencies because, as the Supreme
Court has concluded, courts are "not at liberty to substitute [their] own
discretion for that of administrative officers who have kept within the bounds
of their administrative powers." Unlike with older, tax specific precedent,
today courts and most academics argue that the Treasury Department should
enjoy the deference generally applicable to other administrative agencies.
This results in significant deference to final, legislative regulations.116 It does
112 Altera Corp. v. Commissioner, 145 T.C. No. 3 (2015). The government has filed
notice of appeal.
113 Recent Case, Administrative Law-Judicial Review of Treasury Regulations, 126
HARV. L. REv. 1747, 1752-53 (2013).
114 Ellen Aprill, A Case Study of Legislation vs. Regulation, 63 DUKE L.J. 1636, 1642
(2014).
115 AT&T Co. v. United States, 299 U.S. 232, 236-37 (1936).
116 Jeremiah Coder, Year in Review: Tax Law's Vanity Mirror Shattered, 134 TAX NOTES
35 (2012). The reenactment doctrine might have held on the longest in tax with the Treasury
Department arguing for departmental interpretations if Congress re-enacted a statute without
adjusting for the agency's interpretation. In Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States, 507
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not clarify the amount of deference that should be given other types of
regulations - interpretive, proposed, temporary - and deference to other
tax guidance is even more uncertain. 1 1
Generally applicable standards of deference to administrative guidance
have evolved in fits and starts over the years. This leaves agencies, courts,
and taxpayers struggling to determine what deference to apply in a given
situation. In 1944, the Supreme Court adopted a moderately deferential role
in reviewing agency action in Skidmore v. Swift & Co., denying that an
agency's interpretation would control a court's decision. In theory, deference
has been expanded. Under Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc.,l19 decided in 1984, the Court required mandatory deference to
an agency's reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statute. Congressional
delegations of authority are held to reflect a presumptive evaluation that the
agency is better positioned, possesses more expertise, and is more politically
responsive than the courts. Notwithstanding Chevron's broad language,
courts often struggle applying its standard and agencies are unsure of how it
will be applied in each particular instance as they create guidance. 120
Unfortunately, courts do not clearly or consistently apply any of the
deference standards, and scholars debate the effect deference has on the
outcome of cases. 12 1 For example, under the lesser Skidmore test, empirical
studies found that agency actions were upheld between thirty percent and
sixty percent of the time. 122 On the other hand, when using Chevron review,
U.S. 546 (1993), the majority rejected the Service's argument that the reenactment of the Code
with this long-standing regulation gave it the force and effect of law. The dissent relied on the
reenactment doctrine to rule for the force of the regulations.
117 For example, Professor Coverdale argues there were three types of deference for
Treasury guidance. John F. Coverdale, Chevron s Reduced Domain, 55 ADMIN. L. REV. 39
(2003). Andre L. Smith argues for greater deference to Tax Court decisions. See Andre Smith,
Deferential Review of the United States Tax Court, after Mayo Foundation v. United States,
58 TAX LAW. 361 (2005).
118 Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
119 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
120 Ellen P. Aprill, The Interpretive Voice, 38 LOYOLA OF L.A. L. REV. 2081 (2005); Lisa
S. Bressman, How Mead Has Muddled Judicial Review of Agency Action, 58 VAND. L. REV.
1443 (2005); Mark Seidenfeld, Chevron's Foundation, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 273 (2011).
Chevron states that deference is not contingent upon the existence of notice and comment. For
a statement of the government's "elaborate" rulemaking process, see MAEVE P. CAREY,
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, THE FEDERAL RULEMAKING PROCESS: AN OVERVIEW
(June 17, 2013).
121 Kristin Hickman & Matthew Krueger, In Search of the "Modern" Skidmore
Standard, 108 COLUM. L. REv. (2007); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Democratizing the
Administrative State, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 559, 568-69 (2006); Amy Wildermuth, Solving
the Puzzle of Mead and Christensen, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1877, 1898-99 (2006); Eric
Womack, Into the Third Era ofAdministrative Law, 107 DICK. L. REV. 289, 325-28 (2002).
122 Hickman & Krueger, supra note 121; Wildermuth, supra note 121, at 1898-99;
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courts upheld agency actions between sixty percent and seventy percent of
the time.123 Not focusing on tax, Professor David Zaring argues that different
standards of review can really be boiled down to the reasonableness of the
agency's guidance.1 24
Despite the existence of generally applicable rules, courts often follow
tax specific precedent, as they do with other specialized areas of law.
"[S]pecialized practices . .. prefer their particular deference precedents and
continue to cite them, often leading the Court to follow suit. The best example
of this phenomenon is tax (always a special case, concededly)."1 25 Tax
regulations have always received deference from courts, but not to the extent
demanded by Chevron in the case of ambiguous statutory language.1 26 The
leading case establishing deference in taxation is National Muffler Dealers
Association v. United States.127 In National Muffler, the Supreme Court held
that courts should defer to a Treasury regulation only if it "implement[s] the
congressional mandate in some reasonable manner.,,128 At least one popular
secondary source still cites to tax's National Muffler standard.1 29
The tax-specific standard makes it harder to secure deference for tax
guidance. Although Chevron requires a rather passive review of
reasonableness, under National Muffler the determination for whether tax
guidance is reasonable is made through a weighing of factors asking
"whether the regulation harmonizes with the plain language of the statute, its
origin, and its purpose."1 3 0 Under the latter test, the Treasury Department's
special expertise in the field of tax may be used as a factor. On the other hand,
that much of tax litigation occurs in the specialized Tax Court where judges
have their own knowledge may mitigate against special deference based on
expertise.131 Certainly, a significant amount of tax guidance is only given
Womack supra note 121, at 325-28.
123 David Zaring, Reasonable Agencies, 96 VA. L. REv. 135, 170-76 (2010). Courts have
decided issues of deference and the validity of Treasury regulations on multiple grounds. See
e.g., Intermountain Ins. Serv. of Vail LLC v. Commissioner, 134 T.C. 11 (2010). There were
three different opinions in support of denying deference to Treasury regulations in
Intermountain.
124 Zaring, Reasonable Agencies, supra note 123, at 137.
125 William Eskridge & Lauren Baer, The Continuum of Deference, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083,
1108 (2008).
126 Noel Cunningham & James Repetti, Textualism and Tax Shelters, 24 VA. TAX REV.
1, 46 (2004).
127 National Muffler Dealers Ass'n v. United States, 440 U.S. 472 (1979).
128 Id. at 476.
129 I CASEY FED. TAX PRAC. § 1.40 n.l (2015).
130 National Muffler Dealers Ass 'n, 440 U.S. at 477.
131 Mitchell M. Gans, Deference and the End of Tax Practice, 36 REAL PROP. PROB. &
TRUST J. 731, 757, 788-89 (2002). Agency expertise was not included in Skidmore's list of
factors, but expertise played a role in that opinion. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134,
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deference to the extent it had the power to persuade. But with the balancing,
the Court in National Muffler concluded that the "choice among reasonable
interpretations is for the Commissioner, not the courts." 132
The conflict between Chevron and National Muffler was partially abated
in 2001. In United States v. Mead Corp.,133 the Supreme Court limited
Chevron deference in the tax context, although the limits and how they would
apply remained unclear. In Mead, the corporation challenged the
classification of its diaries, notebooks, and day planners for tariff purposes.
Thousands of similar tariff decisions are made each year and have no
precedential value and, according to the majority, should not be given
Chevron deference. Despite resolving the case, Mead failed to clarify when
Chevron or another standard would apply. The American Bar Association
(ABA) complained that "[r]eaders of the Court's post-Chevron tax opinions
are left wondering whether the Court applies a unique analysis when deciding
cases involving deference to IRS interpretations of tax law."1
34
The Supreme Court again reached the issue of deference to tax guidance
in 2011. The Court unanimously extended Chevron to tax regulations in
Mayo Foundation Jbr Medical Education & Research v. United States.13 5 In
Mayo, taxpayers challenged the Treasury Department's regulatory
interpretation that changed a long-standing agency interpretation.1
Although claiming the rules resulted from the Department's general authority
to issue needful rules and regulations, the Department did use notice and
comment procedures, a fact noted by the Court. Siding with the government,
the Court followed Chevron rather than National Muffler, as the taxpayer had
urged. Thereafter, the Court ruled that the Treasury Department "certainly
did not act irrationally" in its regulations as it upheld their application. 137
Chevron deference has not always resulted in victory for the
government; often courts fail to find the necessary statutory ambiguity to
entitle guidance to deference. For example, in 2012, in United States v. Home
Concrete & Supply, LLC,138 the Supreme Court reviewed final regulations
137-40 (1944). Mead expressly included expertise as a factor. United States v. Mead Corp.,
533 U.S. 218, 228 (2001). Hickman and Krueger lament that courts' references to expertise
are often "mere throwaway lines tacked onto independent decisions to defer to the agency."
Hickman & Kreuger, supra note 121, at 1289, 1293-94.
132 National Mufflers Deal Ass n, 440 U.S. at 488.
13 Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
134 Irving Salem et al., ABA Section of Taxation Report of the Task Force on Judicial
Deference, 57 TAx LAw. 717, 763 (2004).
1 Mayo Foundation for Medical Education & Research v. United States, 562 U.S. 44
(2011).
136 Id.
137 Id. at 60.
138 United States v. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC, 132 S.Ct. 1836 (2012).
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extending the statute of limitations to apply to a well-known abusive tax
shelter involved in the litigation. The Code provides a six-year, as opposed
to the general three-year, statute of limitations for gross understatements of
income. 139 The case involved overstated basis and the use of that basis to
eliminate tax on gains. Judicial precedent predating the regulations held that
overstatement of basis was not the same as the understatement of income
despite having the same economic effect.140 Based on this precedent, the
Court found there was no statutory ambiguity and therefore no need to defer
to the Treasury Department. Congress has since changed the statute to
overturn Home Concrete.14 1
Showing even greater disregard for agency guidance, courts may side
step granting deference despite admitting the application of Chevron. In
2014, in King v. Burwell,142 the Supreme Court refused to defer to Treasury
Department regulations interpreting provisions of the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act. The regulations denied tax credits to persons who
purchased health insurance from exchanges not directly established by a
state. Despite finding the language ambiguous, the first step of Chevron, the
Court then interpreted the provision in a manner "that is compatible with the
rest of the law." 143 Taking power from the agency to interpret the law, the
Court created its own operational rules on the grounds that, if Congress
wanted to assign such power over the new healthcare system to the agency,
Congress "surely would have done so expressly." 44
Thus, courts appear reluctant to defer to the Treasury Department
notwithstanding Chevron. This makes the appropriate deference to tax
guidance other than regulations even more uncertain. Revenue Rulings have
received some deference in the past, but their future is indeterminate. Rulings
have less weight than regulations but, according to the Service, "may be used
as precedents" by both taxpayers and the Service. 145 In 2014 in United States
v. Quality Stores Inc.,146 a taxpayer raised the deferential value of Revenue
Rulings but the Supreme Court decided not to rule on this issue, finding a
conclusion on the issue unnecessary to resolve the case. As such, the issue
remains ripe for decision. Some deference is likely, but it is implausible that
a clear standard will be developed.
139 I.R.C. § 6501(a), (e)(1)(A) (2016).
140 Colony, Inc. v. Commissioner, 357 U.S. 28 (1958).
141 Surface Transportation and Veterans Healthcare Choice Improvement Act of 2015,
Pub. L. No. 114-41, 129 Stat. 443.
142 135 S.Ct. 2480 (2015).
143 Id. at 2492.
144 Id. at 2483.
145 Rev. Proc. 89-14, 1989-8 I.R.B. 20; I.R.M. 32.2.2.10 (Aug. 11, 2004).
146 United States v. Quality Stores, Inc. 134 S.Ct. 1395, 1405 (2014).
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This issue of deference creates a circular problem with the process
required for guidance's creation. To the extent that tax guidance is given
deference, there is greater administrative concern for its creation. The more
procedure adopted, the greater deference sought. Because Chevron deference
may (although often does not) tip the scales in favor of the government over
the taxpayer in tax litigation, 14 7 it is possible that such deference should only
be given to guidance created with significant administrative procedure.
III. BEWARE WHAT YOU ASK FOR
The existence of various forms of tax guidance is not exceptional as most
agencies promulgate guidance and many agencies have different forns to
meet different needs. Critics contend that the process used to create these
various forms of tax guidance is exceptional for failing to comply with the
APA's stipulated processes.148 Unfortunately, their analysis compares the tax
system's method against the APA as opposed to other agencies' methods.
This part examines how these critics not only fail to consider problems
inherent in the APA as they advocate stamping the APA's procedures onto
the tax system, they fail to confirm whether other agencies achieve their
APA-based ideal.
A. Objectionable objectives
The APA contains broadly applicable and (ironically labeled) informal
procedural rules that originated in response to waves of New Deal legislation
and the seemingly all-powerful executive. 149 The procedures are to promote
public deliberation, reasoned agency decision-making with fewer errors, and
agency accountability to the public and Congress.1 50 The APA attempts to
accomplish these goals by encouraging public participation in the rulemaking
process. However, the procedures the APA imposes, which critics want to
be expanded into the creation of tax guidance, do not always accomplish
these goals and may inadvertently make it harder for agencies to do so.
Therefore, the focus for agencies should be whether the agency's process
147 Mitchell M. Gans, Deference and the End of Tax Practice, 36 REAL PROP. PROB. &
TRUST J. 731, 735 (2002).
148 See supra note 25. For a history of the APA and the creation of tax guidance, see
Camp, supra note 25.
I49 Martin Shapiro, A Golden Anniversary?: The Administrative Act of 1946, 19 REG. 40,
40-41 (1996).
150 Lisa Schultz Bressman, Procedures as Politics in Administrative Law, 107 COLUM.
L. REV. 1749 (2007).
15 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE ACT, 26 (1947).
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accomplishes the goals of administrative law rather than whether the agency
satisfies the process itself, particularly if the goals are met and there is a
colorable explanation why the APA's process should not apply.1 52
Unless Congress explicitly legislates otherwise, the APA requires the
public be given notice of all federal agencies' proposed rules and the agency
consider the public's response after a reasonable comment period.' 1 3 There
remains ambiguity as to what this actually requires. The APA mandated
notice-and-comment procedure has developed a life beyond the strict
statutory requirements, but what that requires is not always clear ex ante.
Additionally, the APA's processes apply to all agency rules that have the
force of law, although what has the force of law is also debated.1 54
Fundamentally, the APA's command that "the agency shall give
interested persons an opportunity to participate in the rule making through
submission of written data, views, or arguments" is an inviolate principle of
agency rule-making.1 55 This notice is to "fairly apprise interested parties of
the issues involved, so that they may present responsive data or argument."'1
56
Courts treat this notice requirement seriously, invalidating rules that fail to
provide sufficient notice. 157 This process encourages open doors for any and
all to participate with any information they choose to share.
The agency must consider all comments the public chooses to submit,
which is generally accepted to mean the agency must process all, and respond
to all relevant, comments.1s Perhaps more importantly, despite the need to
respond to comments, the agency cannot change the rule substantially in
response to comments without starting the notice-and-comment process over
again.1 59 This last requirement, and the various forms of intellectual lock-in
that accompany it, caused Professor Stephanie Stern to conclude that notice-
and-comment actually reduces the value of public participation by
prematurely committing agencies to proposed rules. 160
Notwithstanding the reluctance to substantially change language, unless
the agency responds to almost all comments, the agency risks the guidance's
invalidation. Although administrative law requires the public's comments to
152 The author will argue in another paper why the good cause exemption should apply
in the tax context.
5 U.S.C. § 553(b)-(c) (2012).
154 Hickman, Unpacking the Force ofLaw, supra note 25.
155 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2012).
156 S. REP. No. 79-752, at 200 (1945).
157 See e.g., Global Van Lines, Inc. v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 714 F2.d 1290 (5th
Cir. 1983) (holding that the Interstate Commerce Commission's failure to articulate the legal
basis for a rule "effectively deprived the petitioners of the opportunity to present comments.").
5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2012).
5 Wagner, supra note 48, at 1354.
160 Stephanie Stem, Cognitive Consistency, 63 U. PITr. L. REv. 589, 620-630 (2002).
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cover "the waterfront of their concerns and ideally do so in detail" before the
agency's failure to respond to the comment would form the basis of a
successful legal challenge, the perception of agency discretion and agency
.161
capture motivated courts to impose stringent requirements on agencies.
The hard look doctrine emerged in the early 1970s to require an agency to
consider all comments and to explain why it was not persuaded by all but
frivolous comments. Hard look review imposes close judicial scrutiny on the
rulemaking process to ensure an agency's rule has adequately considered all
comments and adequately supported its contested assumptions.162
One difficulty with hard look review is that the doctrine imposes no
limits on the size, number, detail, or technicality of the issues that can be
raised.163 Moreover, the level of review that is required for an agency rule to
be upheld is not predictable; Professor Jerry Mashaw argues that courts
function as "robbed roulette wheels" when reviewing agency guidance.1 64
Agencies must decide whether to devote resources to the rebuttal of possibly
meaningless comments without knowing courts' expectations, so agencies
may rationally devote too much or too little resources to the process from a
judicial perspective.
The notice and comment procedure, coupled with hard look review,
makes some experts question whether federal rulemaking has ossified. 165
Ossification is the idea that procedural constraints imposed on federal
agencies have the undesirable consequence of making the process so
burdensome that agencies routinely delay or defer issuing guidance.' 66
Agencies understand that the process after notice has been filed may take
years. Pre-notice rulemaking may even be longer; some estimate more than
twice as long because of the risk of judicial invalidation if a final regulation
is not in essentially the same form as the proposed rule. This requires a
161 Wagner, supra note 48, at 1352.
162 Id. at 1357.
163 RICHARD PIERCE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE at 447-50 (4th ed. 2002); Edward
Rubin, It's Time to Make the Administrative Procedure Act More Administrative, 89 CORNELL
L. REV. 95, 116-18 (2003); Wagner, supra note 48, at 1352.
164 Wagner, supra note 48, at 1360 (citing JERRY MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS, AND
GOVERNANCE 181 (1999)).
165 Edward Rubin, It's Time to Make the Administrative Procedure Act More
Administrative, 89 CORNELL L. REv. 95 (2003); Jason Webb Yackee & Susan Webb Yackee,
Testing the Ossification Thesis: An Empirical Examination ofFederal Regulatory Volume and
Speed, 1950-1990, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1414 (2012) (testing rulemaking at the Department
of the Interior); see also Richard Pierce, Jr., Rulemaking Ossification is Real, 80 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 1493 (2012) (responding to Yackee & Yackee).
166 Id.
167 Asimow, supra note 41, at 345; Pierce, supra note 25, at 12. In the tax context, this
means that some important regulations "are inevitably slow in coming" and often create a
"premium on being the first to market" with tax abusive transactions. Committee on
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serious commitment of agency resources to undertake the issuance of
guidance.
Examples of ossification abound. The Occupational Safety and Health
Administration takes an average of ten years to develop and promulgate a
health or safety standard.168 A study of the Environmental Protection Agency
found it required approximately five and a half years to issue each of ninety
rules, including many that were not economically significant.169 Even after
twenty years, the EPA has failed to issue judicially satisfactory rules
regarding the interstate transportation of pollution. 170 Unfortunately, experts
cannot explain why some issues ossify and others do not.171
Even after the added delay of ossification, rules that complete the notice
and comment process are not free from judicial invalidation. Courts reject
thirty percent of rules that go through notice and comment because the
agency did not adequately respond to one or more submitted comments. 172
And lawyers of interested parties critical of the proposed rules have learned
to submit voluminous comments. 173
Thus, the risk to published guidance of requiring notice and comment is
substantial because it may delay its creation. Moreover, the process may not
address existing concerns about guidance. At one high-level roundtable talk,
the complaint was not the lack of notice and comment in the making of tax
guidance but the Treasury Department and the Service's fear of "getting it
wrong" and therefore delaying guidance,174 a problem likely exacerbated if
notice and comment were used more robustly. Fear of guidance being
overturned is likely increased by the formal procedures of the APA, which,
as stated above, results in thirty percent of rules being invalidated on
procedural grounds. "The nation simply cannot afford to allow courts to delay
interminably the process of issuing tax rules."
175
That procedural challenges to tax guidance context generally occur only
Partnerships, NY State Bar Association, Report on the proposed Partnership Antiabuse Rule,
64 TAX NOTES 233, 235 (July 11, 1994).
168 MAEVE P. CAREY, CONG. RESEARCH SERVICE, THE FEDERAL RULEMAKING PROCESS:
AN OVERVIEW 3 (2013).
169 Wendy Wagner et al., Rulemaking in the Shade, 63 ADMIN L. REv. 99, 143-45 (2011).
170 EME Homer City Generation, L.P. v. EPA, 696 F.3d 7, 24 n.18 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
1' See Jacob E. Gersen & Anne O'Connell, Deadlines in Administrative Law, 156 U. PA.
L. REv. 923 (2008); Anne Joseph O'Connell, Political Cycles of Rulemaking, 94 VA. L. REV.
889 (2008); Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard W. Murphy, Eight Things Americans Can't Figure
Out About Controlling Administrative Power, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 5 (2009).
172 Pierce, supra note 25, at 10.
1 Id. at 9-10.
174 Amy S. Elliott, Roundtable Panelists Bemoan Tax Guidance Processes, 132 TAX
NOTES 473 (August 1, 2011).
175 Pierce, supra note 25, at 18.
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after the guidance has been applied to taxpayers through the audit process is
especially troubling.1 76 Long-term uncertainty regarding the validity of
guidance threatens the credibility of the tax system. If guidance has the force
of law, their validity needs to be assured. The required delay before taxpayers
may litigate procedural issues risks legitimating the regulations' underlying
policies even though the litigation may render regulations invalid for those
who want to rely on the guidance for planning purposes.1 7 7
Recognizing that notice and comment procedures are not always in the
public's best interest, the APA contains exemptions from notice and
comment.17 8 One exemption from the notice and comment requirement is the
good cause exemption. Under the good cause exemption, agencies are
permitted to issue binding guidance immediately but must explain why
adhering to the default notice and comment process is "impracticable,
unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest." 18 0 Courts often interpret this
exemption narrowly and skeptically. 8 '
The Treasury Department often relies on the good cause exemption to
issue tax regulations without the required explanation of why the regulations
should be issued without antecedent notice and comment. 2 Although
approximately twenty-five percent of all federal agency actions invoke the
good cause exemption, Professor Juan Lavilla notes the comparatively
egregious misuse of the good cause exemption in the area of tax regulations
is "particularly remarkable."1 Focusing only on tax regulations, Professor
Hickman concludes that "courts are unlikely to find Treasury's blanket
assertions of APA section 553(b)'s inapplicability [or its more explicit
assertions of the good cause exemption] sufficient explanation to sustain a
176 If procedural challenges become the norm, the Anti-Injunction Act and the
Declaratory Judgment Act might need to be repealed.
77 Paul G. Chevigny, Fairness and Participation, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1211, 1219-22
(1989); Jessica Mantel, Procedural Safeguards for Agency Guidance, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 343,
348-351 (2009).
1 Mantel, supra note 177, at 346-47.
5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3) (2012).
1o 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(B) (2012).
181 Hickman, Unpacking the Force of Law, supra note 25, at 493-94.
12 Treasury spokesman Andrew DeSouza took issue with Hickman's conclusion that the
Treasury Department does not comply with the APA. Jeremiah Coder, Study Finds Treasury
Isn't Complving with Procedure Act, 116 TAx NOTES 636 (Aug. 20, 2007). DeSouza stated,
"Treasury and the IRS take the Administrative Procedure Act very seriously and fully comply
with it and all other procedural requirements when issuing regulations and other published
guidance." Id at 637.
83 Juan Lavilla, The Good Cause Exemption to Notice and Comment Rulemaking
Requirements Under the Administrative Procedure Act, 3 ADMIN. L.J. 317, 338-341 (1989)
(stating incorrectly that the Service creates the regulations, rather than the Treasury
Department); see also Asimow, Public Participation, supra note 41, at 347-50.
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claim of good cause." 184 Arguing the "circumstances in which Treasury
issues temporary regulations typically are not particularly dire," Professor
Hickman dismisses most uses of this regulatory exemption as currently
employed by the Treasury Department.1 85
However, good arguments can be made for the good cause exemption to
apply widely in the tax context. Currently, tax provisions are tied to the
federal government's budget and there are restrictions on both deficit
spending and the national debt.186 As a part of federal fiscal planning, tax
provisions are almost always estimated to have immediate effect, and that
estimation is necessary in order to accomplish other goals of federal
budgeting. In other words, if tax provisions were given delayed effective
dates to permit time for notice and comment, this delay would alter the cost
calculation of the federal budget. Instead, the existence of a workable regime
is presumed; the alternative conditions budgeting on Treasury Department
action.
Because of the assumption that tax provisions are immediately effective
and their effect is built into the budgeting process, Congress implicitly
demands quick (before fiscal year end) issuance of implementing rules.1 87
Therefore, the good cause exemption from notice and comment should
arguably apply any time that revenue estimates for tax legislation are
incorporated by Congress into the budget. If Congress expects tax provisions
to operate immediately, the Treasury Department, as an executive agency
tasked with making it operational, must create guidance quickly. Under this
theory, the strongest case for the good cause exemption can be made for new
legislation because the revenue raised in new legislation is used to balance
spending in the current year's budget bills. However, even with long-
established legislation, current year budgetary consequences demand
implementation of a workable regime.
A second APA exemption from notice and comment that the Treasury
Department frequently relies upon is for guidance that is not legislative but
merely interprets the law or provides agency policy. This argument is used
184 Hickman, Coloring Outside the Lines, supra note 27, at 1780.
185 Id. at 1783.
186 DEP'T OF TREASURY, DEBT LIMIT, https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives /Pages/
debtlimit.aspx (last visited Mar. 30, 2016); CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, BASELINE
BUDGET AND ECONOMIC PROJECTIONS, https://www.cbo.gov/about/products (last visited Mar.
30, 2016).
187 BORIS BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES &
GIFTS I 16.3 (2016).
88 For more on interpretive rulemaking, see Hickman, Coloring Outside the Lines, supra
note 27, at 1760-63, 1796-97; Stephen Johnson, In Defense of the Short Cut, 60 U. KAN. L.
REv. 495, 509 (2012); Thomas Meill & Kathryn Watts, Agency Rules with the Force of Law,
116 HARv. L. REv. 467, 570-576 (2002).
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extensively by the Treasury Department because it claims all of its guidance
issued under its general authority are interpretive. In other areas of law,
however, courts have determined that the historical basis of the distinction
between legislative and interpretive guidance no longer applies. Instead,
under current administrative law, general grants of rulemaking authority are
regularly construed as conferring on the agency the power to promulgate
rules with the force of law and are thus legislative.189 Nevertheless, the
Treasury Department claims more than ninety percent of tax regulations are
interpretive and excepted from notice and comment on that basis. 190 Because
of this divergence from administrative law precepts, the Treasury
Department's argument is increasingly under threat in the move away from
tax exceptionalism.
When not excepted from notice and comment procedures, agencies face
significant costs associated with compliance. Although it is impossible to
calculate all of the costs of rulemaking because data is unavailable or
immeasurable,'1 9 Professor David Franklin notes, "Congress, the President,
and the courts have all taken steps that have made the notice-and-comment
rulemaking process increasingly cumbersome and unwieldy." 1 92 Even critics
of tax exceptionalism note that the "procedures are quite burdensome."1
9 3
Many federal agencies have responded by foregoing notice and comment and
issuing interpretive tools, policy statements, and informal guidance.1 94
"[B]usy staffs, tight budgets, and a variety of competing priorities" may
affect how agencies weigh the choice of rulemaking tools.1 95
Because of the significant costs of compliance with the APA, some have
already noted that requiring notice and comment for all tax guidance would
189 Asimow, Public Participation, supra note 41, at 358. Focusing on the potential for
penalties through failure to follow even interpretive regulations, Professor Hickman argues to
eliminate tax's exceptionalist grasp on interpretive regulations. 89 TEX. L. REv. 499, 520
(2011). One tax attorney complained of "[t]he Treasury Department's apparent inclination, to
a much greater degree than would have been imaginable previously, to take on the role of
lawmaker in the absence of a specific congressional mandate to do so." Mark E. Berg, Judicial
Deference to Tax Regulations, 61 TAX LAW. 481, 483 (2008).
190 See Asimow, Public Participation, supra note 41, at 370.
191 Jerry Mashaw, Improving the Environment of Agency Rulemaking, 57 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBs. 185, 188 (1994); Mark Seidenfeld, Playing Games with the Timing of
Judicial Review, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 85 (1997).
192 David Franklin, Legislative Rules, Nonlegislative Rules, and the Perils of the Short
Cut, 120 YALE L.J. 276, 283 (2010).
"9 Hickman, Unpacking the Force of Law, supra note 193, at 473; Kristin Hickman, A
Problem of Remedy, supra note 27, at 1203.
194 Stephen M. Johnson, Good Guidance, Good Grief?, 72 Mo. L. REv. 695, 695 (2007).
1 Michael Asimow, Interim-Final Rules, 51 ADMIN. L. REv. 703, 711 (1999); see also
Michael Asimow, Nonlegislative Rulemaking and Regulatory Reform, 1985 DuKE L.J. 381,
404-09 (1985).
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be "ridiculously wasteful" of scarce agency resources and "could dry up this
important tool for communicating with taxpayers." 196 Professor Richard
Pierce, historically a proponent of notice and comment for binding rules
despite a concern for ossification,197 worries that the Treasury Department
lacks the resources to comply with the APA for its fifty-thousand to fifty
million decisions each year.198 The cost is likely to affect all Treasury
Department guidance. Expecting the Treasury Department to recognize, in
advance, which guidance is likely to face challenge from an unknown
taxpayer fighting a determination of liability is asking the agency to
anticipate challenges in ways other agencies have failed to do. If, in response
to fears of litigation and invalidation by courts, other agencies produce reams
of paperwork, it is unreasonable to assume the Treasury Department would
not follow the same pattern.
What is worse is that, despite its costs, notice and comment often does
not accomplish its objectives. Notice and comment may not guarantee any
more meaningful public participation than exists in the current process for
formulating tax guidance. "Notice-and-comment does not always provide
genuine public participation in legislative rulemaking; it is useful primarily
as a record-making device and is generally employed when a rule is in near-
final form." 199 After noting that no administrator uses notice-and-comment
if they are "genuinely interested" in input, Professor Donald Elliott
explained, "[n]otice-and-comment rulemaking is to public participation as
Japanese Kabuki theater is to human passions - a highly stylized process
for displaying in a formal way the essence of something which in real life
takes place in other venues." 200 Informal meetings, roundtables, speeches and
leaks, advisory committees, and negotiated rulemaking are better ways to
obtain feedback from the public. 20 1
If the goal is to increase public access to and accountability for the
resulting tax guidance, requiring notice and comment might have the
opposite effect. Currently, much of the government's actions with respect to
federal income taxation are open to the public (or more accurately their tax
advisors) through published guidance. Slowing publication or discouraging
the production of published guidance may hide the agency's decision-
making. In other words, increasing the costs or difficulty of producing
guidance threatens to push agency decision-making out of public view. This
196 Hickman, Unpacking the Force ofLaw, supra note 25, at 471-472, 531.
197 Richard Pierce, Jr., Seven Ways to Deossify Agency Rulemaking, 47 ADMIN L. REV.
59, 82-86 (1995).
198 Pierce, supra note 25, at 1-2.
199 E. Donald Elliott, Re-Inventing Rulemaking, 41 DUKE L.J. 1490, 1490 (1992).
200 Id. at 1492.
201 Id. at 1492-93.
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is particularly important in tax matters because litigation often occurs only
after audit. Guidance is needed before tax filing in order for taxpayers to have
a sense of the government's position and in audit to ensure consistent
positions among agency personnel.
A side effect of APA procedures is that wealthy or informed participants
may find it easier to capture the Service in the traditional sense of
manipulating the agency to advance the interest group's objectives.
Regulatory capture occurs when interest groups dominate the agency in ways
that are detrimental to the public purpose for which the agency was
created.202 Public choice theorists argue this should be expected when a small
number of interested parties have more at stake than the general public. This
is often the case in taxation. As shown in one model of regulatory capture,
"asymmetric information is the source of regulatory discretion, making
capture possible." 203 An interest group has more power when the group's
interest lies in inefficient, rather than efficient, ties between Congress and the
agency. 204 The more interested parties isolate the agency, the easier it is for
them to directly influence the agency's work. Consequently, creating
additional process and slowing down the production of published guidance
may increase the opportunity for capture by hiding the internal workings of
the agency from the public and their representatives.
In addition to concerns about interested parties' ability to shape
regulatory procedures, these groups may be able to divert agency resources
from other agency activities. To the extent an agency is tasked both with
creating published guidance and with overseeing the application of the law,
the ability to tie up limited agency resources in the creation of guidance
would minimize oversight of tax returns. Put simply, taxpayers can capture
the Service's auditing function by forcing the agency to devote its resources
to providing guidance that can withstand judicial scrutiny. And by limiting
the amount of guidance that can be produced, taxpayers put themselves in a
better position on audit because they are not arguing against an agency's
published position but merely its litigation strategy.
Despite concerns that the APA procedures have significant costs, issues
of procedure have been articulated (and won) in court and have gained
'05traction in scholarly debate. Now that the debate is begun, it produces a
202 Arthur Wilmarth, Turning a Blind Eye, 81 U. CIN. L. REv. 1283, 1417(2013); see also
Ernesto Dal Bo, Regulatory Capture: A Review, 22. OXFORD REV. OF ECON. POL'Y 203, 203
(2006); Jean-Jacques Lafont & Jean Tirole, The Politics ojGovernnent Decision Making, 106
Q. J. OF ECON. 1089 (1991); Michael Levine & Jennifer Forrence, Regulatory Capture, Public
Interest, and the Public Agenda, 6 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 167 (1990).
203 Dal Bo, supra note 202, at 210.
204 Lafont & Tirole, supra note 202, at 1109-10.
2os For example, Mead and then Mayo fanned the flames of debate on regulatory
procedure. See supra part IV.
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cycle for debate, litigation, and change. But if what critics want is greater
public participation in the creation of tax guidance that should be the focus
around which tax guidance is judged and not compliance with a statute that
might fail to accomplish that goal. Thus the question should be refrained to a
review of whether the creation of tax guidance incorporates the public's
concerns or, possibly, unrepresented portions of the public's concerns, as
opposed to whether the guidance is APA compliant. If this change in framing
were made, it would make more acceptable a broad tax-specific good cause
exemption from notice and comment as a result of budgeting expectations.2 0 6
B. No One is Perfect
As critics of tax exceptionalism import administrative law into the study
of taxation, they often fail to examine whether other agencies are any better
than the Treasury Department at satisfying the APA's elaborate processes.
One reading of these critiques is that, while siloing tax, they hope, or expect,
that the tax system can be made a better one through the incorporation of new
ideas. An alternate interpretation, however, is that every agency but for those
associated with tax must have it right. This latter interpretation deprecates the
tax system and risks fueling anti-tax politicians and public sentiment.
Comparing the tax system to an ideal instead of other agencies may paint the
tax system as a worse offender than it actually is.
Instead of situating the Treasury Department's potentially invalid
approach as one of many such failures to live up to the APA, today's tax
critics look only to the Treasury Department. This isolation portrays tax as
particularly egregious in flaunting federal law. Even Professor Hickman's
more comparative work with non-tax norms fails to compare how guidance
in different agencies is created, viewed, and interpreted.207 This is not to
suggest that Professor Hickman and others are unaware that failure to live up
to the APA occurs in areas other than tax, 20 but tax scholarship fails to
analyze the degree to which other agencies get away with not complying with
the APA. Thus, critics further tax exceptionalism even as they attack it.
For example, despite criticism within tax circles for its exceptionalism,
tax regulations have retroactive effect in certain circumstances, including if
they were filed or issued within eighteen months of a statute's enactment or
if necessary "to prevent abuse." 209 Nevertheless, no comparative research has
206 There may be limits to this argument. Because the public does not otherwise
participate when the Service grants someone a tax break, notice and comment may be the only
time that those who seek to prevent a benefit can complain.
207 Hickman, Need for Mead, supra note 25, at 1564-372.
208 Hickman, Unpacking the Force ofLaw, supra note 25, at 467.
209 Before 1996, tax regulations were presumed retroactive, but Congress reversed the
presumption as part of a Taxpayers Bill of Rights unless the regulations were filed or issued
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been done with respect to retroactive regulations. To date, no one has asked
whether the need for deference is more likely in tax than in other areas of the
law 21 or whether other agencies adopt similar practices.211
Studies from outside of tax show that the Treasury Department is not
exceptional in its dismissal of notice and comment. Possibly as a result of its
cost, agencies often avoid notice and comment. The Government
Accountability Office found that, between 2003 and 2010, thirty-five percent
of major rules and forty-four percent of nonmajor rules did not use the notice
of proposed rulemaking. 212 Of these, the Treasury Department was by no
means the largest abstainer from the process.2 1 3 Not looking at tax
specifically, Professor Connor Raso concludes that agencies avoid notice and
comment procedures as the threat of lawsuits decline.214 If there is a low
threat of lawsuit, agencies avoid the procedures ninety percent of the time.2 15
This move away from notice and comment pervades agency action. No
longer restrained by the nondelegation doctrine, which prevented Congress
from delegating legislative power to agencies, agencies have increasingly
issued rules that have the force of law and are doing so with informal
procedures. 2 16
The limits of comparative work extend to the appropriate deference
given to tax guidance. For most non-tax specialists, tax is included in broader
studies of deference without concern for any exceptionalist underpinnings.217
Tax specialists, on the other hand, often question whether Chevron deference
within eighteen months of the statute's enactment or if necessary "to prevent abuse." Pub. L.
No. 104-168, § 1101, 110 Stat. 1462, 1469 (1996). Congress neither defined abuse nor
expressly delegated the power to define this term. Id at 1468-69; see also Bowen v.
Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988) (rejecting retroactive rulemaking by
agencies absent express congressional authorization). But see Geoffrey C. Weien, Note,
Retroactive Rulemaking, 30 HARV. J.L & PUB. POL'Y 749 (2007).
210 Shannon Weeks McCormack, Tax Abuse According to Whom?, 15 FLA. TAX REV. I
(2013).
211 Lederman, supra note 25.
212 U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, FEDERAL RULEMAKING: AGENCIES COULD
TAKE ADDITIONAL STEPS TO RESPOND TO PUBLIC COMMENTS GAO 13-21 (2012). The good
cause exception was cited in 77% of major and 61% of nonmajor rules. Id. at 37.
213 Id. at 11-13. Forty-seven percent of all major final rules and 8% of nonmajor rules
were interim rules that permitted comments after issuance.
214 Connor Raso, Agency Avoidance of Rulemaking Procedures, 67 ADMIN L. REV. 65
(2013).
215 Ad
216 Hickman, Unpacking the Force of Law, supra note 25, at 476-77. This is not a new
concern. See Kenneth Culp Davis, A New Approach to Delegation, 36 U. CHI. L. REv. 713,
713 (1969).
217 See Davis, supra note 216; Hickman, Unpacking the Force of Law, supra note 25, at
470; Raso, supra note 214.
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is appropriate for tax guidance generally and, in particular, for different types
of guidance.218 In doing so, tax specialists often fail to consider deference
given to the array of guidance issued by other agencies. Throughout them all,
discussion regarding tax remains siloed from other agencies' actions.
In the face of limited comparative work, an alternate approach
recognizes the exceptional features of each agency. Not all scholars,
including this one, accept that administrative law's goal should be a broadly
applicable procedural law. Every area of law has attributes that may require
219
exceptional powers or processes. Instead of the current one-size-fits-all
format, procedure should be designed to recognize "varying levels of
expertise, different levels of public interest, and types of responses that typify
the government regulatory process." 22 0 In this view, determining the proper
procedures for each government agency would require an understanding of
the agency's substantive mandate. 22 1
Thus, exceptionalism is not exclusive to the tax system. Despite
administrative law "assum[ing] the existence of core statutes and principles
that apply consistently across agencies," subject-matter exceptionalism is
recognized to occur throughout administrative law.222 Professors Richard
Levy and Robert Glicksman attribute agency-specific precedents to the silo
effect. In the field of organizational management, the silo effect is recognized
as the "propensity of departments or divisions within a large organization to
become isolated, with a resulting failure to communicate and pursue common
goals." 22 3 There are at least three types of costs that drive silos: agency costs
(through which agencies pursue goals different from those of the government
as a whole), transaction costs (which make it difficult for agencies to
cooperate with one another), and information costs (which make it difficult
to share information among agencies). It is information costs that cause
courts to rely on attorneys representing the parties and for attorneys to be
218 John Coverdale, Chevron's Reduced Domain: Judicial Review of Treasury
Regulations and Revenue Rulings After Mead, 55 ADMIN. L. REv. 39 (2003); Mitchell M.
Gans, Deference and the End of Tax Practice, 36 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 731, 792-95
(2002); Hickman, The Need for Mead, supra note 25, at 1538. By arguing Congress only
delegates legislative authority with explicit delegation, Coverdale seeks to influence how non-
tax statutes are interpreted. John Coverdale, Court Review of Tax Regulations and Revenue
Rulings in the Chevron Era, 64 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 35, 38 (1995); see also Lederman, supra
note 25, at 648.
219 Raso, supra note 214.
220 Dorit Rubinstein Reiss, Tailored Participation: Modernizing the APA Rulemaking
Procedures, 12 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 321, 324 (2009).
221 Gellhom & Robinson, supra note 29, at 787.
222 Glicksman & Levy, supra note 26, at 500.
223 Id. at 510.
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specialists.224 Gaining information beyond a narrow specialty is costly.
Because tax law is highly specialized and large in the sense that there is
a vast body of law and guidance, subject matter specialization should be more
pervasive than in less specialized areas of law. 22 5 "[T]he difficulty of keeping
up with even in-field legal developments leaves practitioners with little time
for a hunt - seemingly unnecessary in any event - for relevant cases from
outside the field."226 This specialization is not without cost. The marketplace
of ideas is smaller because of silos, harming both tax and other areas of
'27
administrative law.2 The issue to consider before dismantling the silo
around tax is the relative value of an open market of ideas which may
decrease the ability of anyone to fully comprehend the tax system or a
comprehensive tax system built on the recognition that silos are a necessary
part of a complex administrative state.
Simply shoehorning tax (or any other area of administrative law) into a
general administrative procedure without assessing either the risks or
likelihood of success for that shoehorning is dangerous. As it stands, the
desire to eliminate tax exceptionalism and to integrate tax more fully into the
legal system is proceeding without the necessary comparative work to show
if this is truly warranted. Any issue for which tax is recognized as receiving
different treatment than other areas of law may be subject to criticism that
demands consistency, and perhaps costly or impossible, change.
V. WHAT TAX MIGI-IT LOSE (MORE THAN REVENUE)
The federal tax system raises more than $2.5 trillion in revenue from
almost 240 million taxpayers on a budget of approximately $11.6 billion.228
To do so, the Treasury Department crafts guidance to facilitate consistent
application of the law, both by taxpayers and Service employees. Ignoring
the addition of new burdens on the tax system risks reducing this guidance or
lessening its value to its users. The choice to change the method of producing
tax guidance should only be made after evaluating all possible consequences.
This is not to suggest all of tax's procedures are successful. As the
Treasury Department struggles to apply complicated and often vilified taxes,
the federal government crafts approaches to regulatory matters, some of
which work better than others. In the process, the Treasury Department
illustrates the need to beware the threat of information capture and the need
224 Id. at 561.
225 Zelenak, supra note 1, at 1912 (mentioning the number of cases).
226 d
227 Glicksman & Levy, supra note 26, at 576.
28 INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, 2014 INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE DATA BOOK, at 3 tbl.
1, 4 tbl. 2, 67 tbl. (2014), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/14databk.pdf.
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for reasonable heuristics to facilitate implementation of a complicated
statutory regime. These approaches and their consequences deserve greater
study with an eye to preserving the benefits the Treasury Department now
enjoys.
A. Protection from information capture
The breadth and density of tax law make it natural that interested parties,
already influential in the political process that creates the law, should seek to
influence the creation of guidance that implements the Internal Revenue
Code. From the agency's perspective, in order to issue guidance as well as to
complete most other regulatory tasks, the Treasury Department depends upon
information.229 Therefore, one means for interested parties to exercise
influence is by controlling the information available to an agency.
As mentioned in Part IV, interested parties may seek to influence the
content of agency guidance in ways that are not in the public's interest.230 As
a result, the government must be concerned that interested parties unduly
shape rules and force the shifting of agency resources to activities that are
less taxing on interested parties. With means that are not entirely clear and
deserve further research, the tax process currently addresses this concern, of
course imperfectly. Treasury Department procedures plus statutory and
common law rules serve a filtering function that reduce some threats of
capture in federal taxation.
Interested parties could pursue many types of capture to shape
implementation of the notoriously complicated Internal Revenue Code.
Beyond the scope of this discussion are the financial capture of regulators
based on their material self-interest and cultural capture in which regulators
begin to think like the regulated parties.231 This Part is concerned with three
different forms of information capture. First, a taxpayer might inundate the
Treasury Department with arguments and evidence with the goal of shaping
guidance, possibly by drowning out other interested parties' voices. Second,
a taxpayer might inundate the Department without the intent of capturing
guidance but the result might shift the final guidance and reduce other
activities required of the Department, such as providing customer service or
auditing returns. Third, a taxpayer supplying too much information might
drive out underrepresented parties as the material and discussion becomes
too complex for these groups to engage with. Simply put, more information
229 Cary Coglianese et al, Seeking Truth for Power: Informational Strategy and
Regulatory Policymaking, 89 MINN. L. REv. 277 (2004).
230 See Asofsky, supra note 95.
231 Nicholas Bagley, Agency Hygiene, 89 TEX. L. REv. 1, 2 (2010); Michael E. Levine &
Jennifer L. Forrence, Regulatory Capture, Public Interest, and the Public Agenda: Toward a
Synthesis, 6 J.L. EcoN. & ORG. 167, 179 (1990).
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risks raising the threshold for participation.
Information capture is different than other forms of agency capture and
the iron triangle in which interested parties, congressional committees, and
agencies form mutually beneficial alliances. Instead, through information
capture interested parties determine government agencies' activities and
outcomes by deluging the agency with information and information-related
costs.232 In the battle to capture an agency in this fashion, Professor Wendy
Wagner argues that the "player need not convince his opponents of the merits
of his case; he need only wear them down enough to cause them to throw in
their towels and give in."233 The audience, rather than the speaker, is the
person who suffers the true cost of information.
Agencies risk being swamped with information because the APA fails
to require the filtering of information.234 Nothing within administrative law
ensures interested parties provide the right level of information for the
intended audience or purpose. Even assuming no interested party has a bad
intent, a system that seeks maximum participation encourages the creation of
information, despite each additional word or participant adding little to the
235process. As a consequence of the resulting deluge, information itself
becomes an externality for the agency receiving comments.236 When
confronting the externality of too many words and too much data, the agency
must synthesize information, something the APA does not recognize as
critical or as something difficult for agencies to accomplish.
Therefore, more information is not unambiguously good in the creation
of guidance; its benefit depends both on the cost of interpreting the
information and the quality of the information provided.237 The APA does
not recognize that attention, and not information, is the limiting factor in
producing good guidance. The greater need is to "conserve the critical scare
resource - the attention of managers.',238 The risks of this form of capture is
greatest when technical issues dominate rulemaking, a problem that pervades
the tax system. 239
If an interested party can win simply by inundating the agency with
information, the agency begins the guidance-creation process on the
232 Wagner, supra note 48, at 1325.
233 Id. at 1329.
234 Id. at 1323-26.
235 Id. at 1329.
236 ROBERT ASH, INFORMATION THEORY (1965); CLAUDE SHANNON & WARREN WEAVER,
THE MATHEMATICAL THEORY OF COMMUNICATION 31-35 (1949); Henry Smith, Language of
Property, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1105, 1115, 1137-38 (2003).
237 Elizabeth Garrett, Harnessing Politics, 65 U. CHI. L. REv. 501, 558 (1988).
m HERBERT SIMON, ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR 241-43 (4th ed. 1997).
239 Wagner, supra note 48, at 1326.
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defensive. This complicates the agency's goal of creating good guidance. The
Treasury Department's starting position cannot be focusing on developing
the best language in the abstract but how to defend the most acceptable
language in an inevitable legal attack. That attack will come in courts, only
one of which specializes in taxation and is likely to fully understand the
complexities of the issues. 240
This threat is made worse because comments are likely only to come
from those directly facing an increased tax burden from the proposed
regulation. Public choice theory warns that it is the wealthy or informed and
cooperative taxpayers who are likely to capture the rulemaking process and
squeeze out other participants. 24 1 In addition to collective action barriers for
unorganized voices in the regulatory context, Professor Wagner worries that
the increased information costs created by this information may prevent
underrepresented participants from participating. As a result, the agency can
face an onslaught by one side of a particular issue and a dearth of information
from the other. The agency is then left to face off against a barrage of
information from an unopposed, highly engaged interest group, as opposed
to the ideal of a vigorous conflict among interest groups. 24 2 Even if the
agency is able to withstand the assault, it nonetheless has a lopsided
administrative record and the threat of a procedural lawsuit.24 3
Administrative law encourages these threats of capture despite the
recognition in other areas of law that open-ended communication is not
required to produce just results. Property law, jury trials, and appellate review
require speakers to synthesize the information they present and limit the
parties that can speak in order to prevent perversion of the outcome. 2 44
Contract law even more severely limits the parties to those in the contract and
limits their speech to that allowed by opposing parties.245 Through these
rules, these other areas of law have created filtering mechanisms. Filtering in
administrative law is no less necessary to save agencies from capture and
produce the most just outcomes.
When an interested party speaks to inadvertently or strategically win
control over regulatory outcomes, costs are incurred whether or not control
is in fact gained. Stretching an agency's resources threatens its ability to
process information and risks the reduction in published guidance. Published
240 Unlike in most areas of the law, taxpayers have a choice of forum to litigate their tax
controversies: the Tax Court, the District Court, the Court of Federal Claims, and, at times,
the Bankruptcy Court.
241 STEVEN P. CROLEY, REGULATION AND PUBLIC INTERESTS 29-52 (2008).
242 Wagner, supra note 48, at 1332.
243 Id. at 1333-34.
244 Smith, supra note 236, at 1155-56; Wagner, supra note 48, at 1329-30.
245 Smith, supra note 236, at 1177-90; Wagner, supra note 48, at 1329-30.
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guidance may be especially important in taxation because few cases litigate
underlying statutory issues and litigation occurs after tax filing.246 According
to Professor Asimow, the issuance of guidance is "quite sensitive to the
bureaucratic costs of adopting them.,,247 For example, the number of
published revenue rulings declined between 1974 and 1984 by seventy
percent because of the recognition that the process was costly and slow and
the Service needed to divert personnel to higher urgency tasks.248 The less
information that is publicly available creates the potential for discrimination
among taxpayers, advantages former Service employees who can market
their information, and delays resolution of tax audits and litigation.
Another cost of information deluge is that increasing the cost to the
agency of producing guidance without a specifically targeted increase in
funding (not politically likely) requires resources be diverted from other,
equally legitimate agency efforts. Limited funding strains the myth of
agencies' unlimited capacity. Because the Treasury Department operates in
a world of limited budgets, in order to provide the same level of guidance,
finite resources must be reallocated from other activities the more
information (no matter how trivial) is received. In the tax context, to produce
the same amount of guidance, resources must come from creating new
guidance, the audit of tax returns, or customer service. The potential impact
of shifting resources from more politically salient groups or issues, such as
the concern that the elderly and handicapped could not leave messages for
the Service in the last tax filing cycle, risks forcing the Service to reduce the
creation of guidance or the number of audits in order to appease political
constituents. 24 9 The American public is not especially sympathetic to the
Service or to taxes, which should aggravate the choice of allocating scarce
resources among the agency's numerous tasks.
These costs also explain why tax guidance needs to receive some level
of judicial deference, although the cost of production does not determine the
exact level of deference required for each type of guidance. 250 The cost of
creating guidance (and thereby diverting resources from other Service
activity) is offset by reducing audit activity if taxpayers follow the guidance
246 Allowing pre-enforcement substantive review of non-legislative rules would permit
litigation without concrete situations and would significantly frustrate the production of
guidance and the operation of the tax system.
247 Asimow, Nonlegislative Rulemaking and Regulatory Reform, supra note 195 at 406.
248 Id at 407.
249 See e.g., AMS. FOR TAx REFORM, IRS Watchdog: Elderly and Disabled Taxpayers Not
Allowed to Leave Messages, (Jan. 14, 2015, 4:42 PM), http://www.atr.org/irs-watchdog-
elderly-and-disabled-taxpayers-not-allowed-leave-message.
250 Acknowledging that taxpayers want as much guidance as possible, Professor
Hickman questions why guidance is binding on taxpayers. Hickman, A Problem of Remedy,
supra note 27, at 1202 n. 218.
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or enforcement costs if they do not. This potential offsetting of costs may
make it cost effective to shift resources to the creation of guidance to the
extent the guidance reduces the agency's burdens on audit. If on audit or
litigation, guidance is ignored or is merely persuasive as to its argument, the
guidance's relative cost increases by reducing its benefit, possibly making its
production prohibitive. Making guidance optional for taxpayers denies the
government the benefit of trading the guidance that taxpayers want for
planning purposes with an understanding the guidance must guide that
planning.
Considerations of costs to the Treasury Department and the Service are
critical because of the way people respond to the tax regime. The income tax
as a whole is salient to the public, as evidenced by political threats to abolish
the Service. 25 1 For the part of taxes that are salient, the Treasury Department
must find technically defensible and politically acceptable solutions as it
engages in crisis management.252 These issues receive significant press
attention, and it may be hard to create lopsided guidance favoring particular
groups. On the other hand, most tax provisions, other than those establishing
tax rates, gain relatively little of the public's attention. This may impact how
and who makes tax policy.
In salient and complex fields there is pressure for both accountability
and expertise but, as salience drops off, so does the push for accountability.253
Thus, with respect to individual tax provisions, experts have significant
influence but the public has little interest in their operation. As a result, the
risk of agency capture increases to the extent interested parties can utilize
experts.254 Because of the relative lack of public pressure coupled with the
use of experts, politicians are more likely to enact procedural reforms, rather
than substantive ones, as a means to show the public they are taking action
but without grappling with the difficult issues the public does not really care
about.255 Thus, procedure may merely be a means to side step difficult issues
and feed into capture.
This article is not arguing that recognizing the potential threat of
information capture validates all processes that stifle the flow of information.
251 Richard Rahn, Abolish the IRS, WASH. TIMES (Apr. 13, 2015), http://www.
washingtontimes.com/news/2015/apr/13/richard-rahn-abolishing-the-irs; David Drucker, Ted
Cruz Gets Specific on 'Abolishing the IRS,' WASHINGTON EXAMINER (Apr. 27, 2015),
http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/ted-cruz-gets-specific-on-abolishing-the-irs/article
/2563631; Abolish the IRS!, THETEAPARTY.NET, http://act.theteaparty.net/ 10184/abolish-irs
(last visited Mar. 30, 2016).
252 William T. Gormley, Jr., Regulatory Issue Networks in a Federal System, 18 POLITY
595, 618 (1986).
253 Id. at 606.
254 Id. at 616.
255 Id. at 611-13.
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The Treasury Department's procedures are only superior to notice and
comment to the extent they manage the risk of information capture by
requiring a filtering of information without losing the benefit of public
participation. Tax currently has several mechanisms that operate as filters.
First, there are greater external filters in taxation than in other areas of law.
As discussed in Part 11, Congress enacted the Anti-Injunction Act and the
Declaratory Judgment Act and courts impose a limited standing rule, which
together limit the ability and the timing to challenge regulations and thereby
to supply information. Second, the process for creating tax guidance adopts
many less formal procedures, such as round tables and meetings, and limit ex
ante notice and comment so that those who participate are vested in tax
issues, although not necessarily as interested parties. This process is not
sufficiently transparent and needs greater scrutiny. Nevertheless,
experimentation with filters, not without concerns, might produce gains for
all of administrative law.
To be supportable, these filters must appropriately respond to concerns
for public participation. Filters should limit or require synthesizing of
information but not thwart the larger objectives of administrative law. This
puts pressure on what the filter does. Filters can affect the timing of public
comments, the number and type of commentators, or the content itself.2 56
The latter type of filter is difficult under the APA because the APA
encourages unlimited content. This focuses filters on the timing and number
of commentators. The timing of comments is critical because the public needs
guidance not to be delayed in order to comply with the law but the public also
needs the guidance to be well thought out and not change in response to
comments that could have been gained earlier. The number and types of
commentators is important because some are more organized than others.
For the creation of good tax guidance, the absolute number and types of
commentators is less important than that the Treasury Department is
presented with, and properly evaluates, diverse points of view and relevant
data. Representative voices among varied participants need to be heard.
Professor William Gormley argued that professionals, including tax
professionals, should have greater influence in complex areas, such as the tax
system,257 but that does not mean these professionals should be limited to
representing opinions of certain interested groups. Tax professionals are
organized in relatively unbiased groups that often provide evidence for
decision-making in taxation. The American Bar Association Section of
Taxation frequently testifies before Congress and provides studies for the
government.258 In addition, the Tax Executives Institute, the American
256 Wagner, supra note 48, at 1323-26.
257 Gormley, supra note 255, at 606.
258 Section on Taxation, AMERICAN BAR AssOCIATION, http://www.americanbar.org
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Institute of Certified Public Accountants, the American College of Tax
Counsel, and the American Tax Policy Institute educate members and
provide feedback to the government.259 Additionally, large taxpayers
participate through their advocates. 260
Because of the participation of organized interests, the concern should
be narrowed to those times when organized and unorganized taxpayers'
interests diverge, in particular when this divergence can result in isolation of
the uninformed and ill connected.261 Beneficiaries of the tax regime, or those
who enjoy the benefits paid for with tax revenue, often fail to submit
comments when guidance goes through the formulistic system.262 Interested
taxpayers, rather than revenue recipients or even uninterested taxpayers,
predominately provide comments to agencies.263 The focus of procedural
change should not be on the voice of those already disposed to comment but
on finding the voices of those not inclined to submit comments.
Unfortunately, it is unknown whether these voices are silent because of the
lack of a desire to voice opposition to policy choices (in which case no
procedure will produce participation) or because of an inability or
unwillingness to voice opinions through the current system.
An increase in process alone is unlikely to increase the voice of the
underrepresented. Indeed, increasing the need to understand voluminous and
technical information before this group can thoughtfully participate in notice
and comment is likely to reduce, rather than encourage, participation.264
Therefore, even if the government is able to prevent control of the notice and
comment process by highly vocal groups, changes to existing procedure
might actually decrease the participation of those intended to be encouraged.
One alternative is to empower group representation of underrepresented
voices in the creation of tax guidance. Professor Leslie Book suggests this as
a new role for the Taxpayer Advocate Service (TAS) and Low Income
/groups /taxation/policy.html.
259 TAX EXECUTIVES INSTITUTE, INC., https://www.tei.org/Pages/default.aspx (last visited
Mar. 30, 2016); AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS, http://www.
aicpa.org/About/Pages/About.aspx (last visited Mar. 30, 2016); AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TAX
COUNSEL, http://www.actconline.org/other-government-submissions/ (last visited Mar. 30,
2016); AMERICAN TAX POLICY INSTITUTE, https://www.americantaxpolicyinstitute.org/
conferences/ (last visited Mar. 30, 2016).
260 Meg Shreve & Michael M. Gibson, Tax Analysts Picks Washington's Top 5 Tax
Lobbyists, TAX ANALYSTS (Oct. 23, 2012).
261 Hickman, A Problem of Remedy, supra note 27, at 1205.
262 Nina A. Mendelson, Regulatory Beneficiaries and Informal Agency Policymaking, 92
CORNELL L. REv. 397 (2007).
263 Leslie Book, A New Paradigm for IRS Guidance, 12 FLA. TAX REv. 517, 554 (2012).
264 Wagner, supra note 48, at 1335 n.41.
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Taxpayer Clinics (LITCs).265 Currently, the TAS is not given the authority
to engage in rulemaking and federally funded LITCs are prohibited from
doing so even though low-income and disadvantaged taxpayers may not
personally be in the position to monitor the development of guidance. 26 6
Empowering advocates for these taxpayers would further the goals of the
APA, although not as part of the APA procedure itself. If nothing else, this
would help ensure a more balanced approach to notice and comment if it were
adopted, although not sufficiently to outweigh the likelihood of a skewed
record favoring powerful taxpayers.
Creating countervailing interest groups would also better represent the
public in those instances when tax guidance favors particular groups, a
problem unlikely to be resolved by notice and comment alone. Open debates
alone may accomplish little unless opponents can be empowered. In a world
where people do not always recognize tax favoritism as a zero sum game,
guidance that favors a particular group may not have a natural opponent.
Other agencies may not struggle with this problem to the same degree. For
example, the Environmental Protection Agency has the Natural Resources
Defense Council and the Sierra Club on one side versus corporations and
farmers on the other. The creation of tax guidance would benefit by having
representatives of unrepresented groups and the revenue-needing public
participate, although such participation is not conditioned on, or possibly
even furthered by, notice and comment procedures.
There is evidence that the Treasury Department responds to comments
received through the formal notice and comment process. This issue is
particularly relevant in the tax context because of the agency's use of
temporary regulations coupled with proposed regulations. The question
arises whether the use of temporary regulations, which are binding when
issued, coupled with proposed regulations, which must complete notice and
comment to be binding, have a chilling effect on the submission of comments
for the proposed regulations.267 Temporary regulations may entrench the
265 Book, supra note 263, at 529. For a good discussion of the Taxpayer Advocate Service
program, see Bryan Camp, What Good is the National Taxpayer Advocate, 126 TAX NOTES
1243 (2010).
Book, supra note 263, at 529.
267 As mentioned in Part 11, the Treasury Department is not the only agency to use
temporary regulations and even the Administrative Conference of the United States endorsed
the use of interim-final rules. Administrative Conference of the United States, Notice:
Adoption of Recommendations, 60 Fed. Reg. 43108, 43111 (Aug. 18, 1995). Professor
Hickman concludes that temporary regulations violate the APA unless they qualify for an
exception. Hickman, Unpacking the Force of Law, supra note 25, at 493. Professor Asimow
argues that interim-final rules that invite comment thereafter can be valid if the "agency meets
normal APA standards by giving consideration to material public comments." Asimow,
Interini-Final Rules, supra note 195, at 726.
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Treasury Department's views and render notice and comment for proposed
regulations less influential to the final guidance. This result is not yet proven.
From interviews, Professor Asinow concludes that Treasury Department and
Service officials and private-sector professionals cannot discern a difference
in the quality and quantity of public input as between proposed and temporary
regulations, although "nobody can say for sure." 268
The main indication that comments are responded to is through a review
of changes to published guidance. Professor Hickman, a critic of tax's
procedural exceptionalism, concludes from her empirical data that the
Treasury Department often responds to comments by modifying proposed
regulations.269 But many proposed regulations, almost twenty-four percent,
received no comments, and a little more than three percent received only
approval or urges to finalize the proposed regulations.270 Numbers alone only
say so much. Without assessing whether the regulations that received no
comments were of the type likely to be contested, it is impossible to know
whether the Treasury Department responds more or less often to contentious
issues or responds to substantive comments more often than less substantive
ones.
The Treasury Department does make changes to temporary regulations,
which receive greater deference than proposed regulations. Professor
Hickman has found that the Department "[o]ften, though not always"
changes its temporary regulations in response to comments.271 The
Department has even issued successive rounds of temporary regulations in
response to perceived failings.272 Although its procedures need further
research, it is possible that the Treasury Department is supplying a workable
solution to the problem of public participation for temporary regulations.
Consider, for example, a set of temporary regulations critiqued by
Professor Hickman.273 In response to a 2001 Supreme Court opinion, United
Dominion Industries v. United States,274 the Treasury Department began the
rulemaking process in September 2003, issuing a full set of temporary
regulations governing the application of a statutory exclusion from gross
income when a member of a consolidated group realizes discharge of
268 Asimow, Public Participation, supra note 41, at 367. The Treasury Department's
receptivity to comment might differ if temporary regulations have been issued. See id.
However, receptivity might be similarly limited for proposed regulations because of the need
to restart the process if significant changes are made.
269 Hlickman, Coloring Outside the Lines, supra note 27, at 1747.
270 Id. at 1758. These numbers provide no information regarding the effectiveness of
informal communication in the guidance-creation process.
271 Hickman, Unpacking the Force of Law, supra note 25, at 531.
272 Id. at 533.
273 Hickman, Coloring Outside the Lines, supra note 27, at 1802.
274 See United Dominion Industries v. United States, 532 U.S. 822 (2001).
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indebtedness income, a complicated issue from a tax perspective.275 Included
in the notice was a request for comment. The Treasury Department concluded
that a good cause exemption from notice and comment was warranted for the
temporary regulations because of "current circumstances" that made issues
of the discharge of indebtedness "an issue that needs to be addressed at this
time" and because consolidated groups might be taking positions inconsistent
with the principles underlying United Dominion.276
Three months later, in December 2003, based on comments it had
received on the temporary regulations, the Treasury Department amended
those temporary regulations by clarifying a list of tax attributes that might be
affected.277 Although the change was a substantive correction, it was
consistent with the theory of the prior regulation and was only made
proactively enforceable, unless the taxpayer's tax year had not yet closed.
The Treasury Department should not have made the first omission, but that
is no reason to prohibit the Department from making a timely correction
when it was drawn to the Department's attention.
Additionally, in its December 2003 amendment, the Service noted that
it was "aware that there are a number of other technical issues that have been
identified" and which were under study. After three more months, the
Treasury Department again amended the regulations to address one of the
technical issues referenced before, regarding the interaction of these rules
with depreciation recapture in the larger context of these new regulations, a
very refined and targeted issue.17 9 This was less a change to the temporary
regulations than expanding the guidance that was provided.
Finally, in March 2005, the Treasury Department revised and finalized
the regulation and removed all the earlier temporary regulations.280 If the
Treasury Department had, instead, used proposed regulations to issue this
guidance, taxpayers would not have been able to rely on the regulations when
filing their returns. Each change to the temporary regulations applied
prospectively to transactions that had not yet occurred and taxpayers were
able to rely on each set. Moreover, if proposed regulations had been used, the
Treasury Department would not have been able to update its rule without
incurring significant cost. To make substantive changes to proposed
regulations risks restarting the notice and comment process.
Because it chose to use the temporary regulations format, in the eighteen
months before the regulations were finalized, the Department could make
275 T.D. 9098, 68 Fed. Reg. 52487 (Sept. 4, 2003).
276 Id.
277 T.D. 9098, 68 Fed. Reg. 69024 (Dec. 11, 2003).
278 Id.
279 T.D. 9117, 69 Fed. Reg. 12069 (Mar. 15, 2004).
280 T.D. 9192, 70 Fed. Reg. 14395 (Mar. 22, 2005).
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four changes in guidance to give taxpayers its most accurate understanding
of the law and gave taxpayers the ability to rely on that guidance as they
finalized their tax returns. These changes in response to the identification of
problems might be a sign of the agency's responsiveness to taxpayers without
employing an unreasonable amount of resources to provide that response.
The many iterations of this guidance illustrate the larger point that
process in and of itself is not the objective. Despite only receiving one written
comment and two participants in a public hearing,2 the tax system sifted
information and generated public responses to a proposed regulation on
uncertain tax positions in what one professor called "an example of the
triumph of the public participation ideal in administrative rulemaking." 2 82
Formed following various announcements predating the notice of proposed
regulations, this proposed guidance "generated a significant amount of
concern and public comment in the corporate tax community." 28 3 The public
participated in the press, at conferences, and "in the hallways of the IRS
itself." 284 Even if not everyone loves the final product, the final regulations
resulted from "a process reflective of public participation, open deliberation,
and forthright agency explanation."285
On the other hand, the formal process can fail to solicit sufficient public
comment to accomplish the underlying purposes of the APA. For example,
guidance as to innocent spouse relief, a type of tax relief used by married
taxpayers who filed joint tax returns, failed to gain feedback until after the
guidance was finalized. Innocent spouse relief was announced as a notice,
then revenue procedure, and finally a proposed regulation.286 Those proposed
regulations generated no formal public comment, and there is no evidence of
comment along the way.287
When the Treasury Department once actively sought the advice of
281 T.D. 9510, 2001-6 1.R.B. 453.
282 Book, supra note 263, at 521.
283 Id. at 521.
284 Id.
285 Id. at 522.
286 See I.R.S. Notice 98-61, 1998-2 C.B. 758; Rev. Proc. 2000-15, 2000-5 I.R.B. 447
(superseded by 2003-32 I.R.B. 296); Relief From Joint and Several Liability, 66 Fed. Reg.
3888, T.D. 9003, 2002-2 C.B. 294. Although the Treasury Department's view was that the
regulations were exempt from notice and comment, in the preamble the Service noted it had
requested comments from the public in its subregulatory guidance and offered the public the
opportunity to comment again following the issuance of proposed regulations.
287 See Book, supra note 263, at 521-22. In the case of innocent spouse relief, the Service
resisted complaints that came after the guidance was finalized until losing legal challenges and
then changed its interpretation to be consistent with the courts. Rev. Proc. 2013-34, 2013-43
I.R.B. 397; I.R.S. Notice 2012-8, 2012-4 I.R.B. 309; Lantz v. Commissioner, 132 T.C. 131
(2009), rev'd, 607 F.3d 479 (7th Cir. 2010); Manella v. Commissioner, 132 T.C. 196 (2009),
rev'd, 631 F.3d 115 (3d Cir. 2011).
The Perfect Process is the Enemy of the Good Tax
interested taxpayers in the creation of tax guidance, Congress criticized the
solicitation, even though the solicitation yielded minimal results (three
submissions within the first year).288 As part of this solicitation, the Treasury
Department announced a plan for interested parties to propose draft
regulations and policy memoranda. This pilot program was "to solicit greater
input from the public in the initial development of certain guidance
projects,"289 beginning with consideration of a narrow rule governing real
estate mortgage investment conduits, popularly referred to as REMICs. To
facilitate comprehensive submission, submitting parties were permitted to
meet informally with Treasury Department personnel. Congress quickly
terminated the program as granting too much power to participating
interested parties.
This article should not be read to suggest there are no shortcomings with
the Treasury Department's process for crafting tax guidance. But these
shortcomings are unlikely to be resolved with stricter adherence to APA
procedure. For example, for many years academics have worried about tax
guidance creating taxpayer-friendly rules or exclusions from gross income
(so the carving out of certain items from taxation).291 Arguably the Treasury
Department extending these favors to taxpayers is an undemocratic exercise
of power that violates rule of law principles.292 Without notice and comment
or the ability to challenge the guidance before its application, those who do
not benefit from a particular piece of tax guidance have no recourse except
to Congress. While true, there is little reason to think APA procedures will
eliminate targeted tax benefits often adopted for administrative convenience
because, as mentioned above, the procedures do not create opposing parties.
As shown in the earlier discussion of innocent spouse relief, parties do not
always participate in their own interest, so it is unlikely that they will coalesce
288 Tax Administration: Letting Practitioners Help Write Guidance Poses No More Risk
of Influence, TIGTA Says, Daily Tax Rep. (BNA), No. 48 at G-6 (Mar. 12, 2008).
289 I.R.S. Notice 2007-17, 2007-12 1.R.B. 748 (Feb. 28, 2007).
290 Baucus, Grassley Oppose IRS Plan to Outsource Writing ofAgency Rules, 2007 TNT
52-32 (Mar. 15, 2007); Tax Administration: Letting Practitioners Help Write Guidance Poses
No More Risk of Influence, TIGTA Says, Daily Tax Rep. (BNA), No. 48 at G-6 (Mar. 12,
2008); Memorandum from Michael R. Phillips & Nancy A Nakamura, Deputy Inspector
General for Audit, The Published Guidance Program Needs Additional Controls to Minimize
Risks, No. 2008-10-075, (Mar. 4, 2008), https://www.treasury.gov/tigta/auditreports/
2008reports/200810075fr.html.
291 JAMES LANDIS, REPORT ON REGULATORY AGENCIES TO THE PRESIDENT-ELECT 49-51
(1960); William T. Gormley, Jr., Regulatory Issue Networks in a Federal System, 18 POLITY
595 (1986) (omitting tax regulations from his list of regulatory issue areas); Louis L. Jaffe,
The Effective Limits of the Administrative Process, 67 HARv. L. REV. 1105, 1113-19 (1954);
Roger Noll, The Economics and Politics ofRegulation, 57 VA. L. REV. 1016, 1028-30 (1971).
292 Lawrence A. Zelenak, Custom and the Rule of Law in the Administration of the
Income Tax, 62 DUKE L.J. 829 (2012).
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as a group to denounce complicated guidance that favors others but without
direct harm to the groups' members.
Moreover, to the extent groups of taxpayers not directly harmed by a
piece of guidance participate in the creation of that guidance, the risk of
information deluge and capture intensifies. Thus, while underrepresented
groups should be encouraged to participate in the formation of guidance, their
message also needs to be filtered. Potential participants in tax debates could
be limitless. We might agree that minority students should be able to argue
that tax-exempt private schools exclude them, but we might be less
supportive of businesses arguing that accelerated depreciation for other
businesses decrease opportunities or of renters challenging the home
mortgage interest deduction as inequitable. When the public as a group shares
concerns about unfair agency administration, courts routinely dismiss their
generalized grievances to prevent overuse of the court system as "no more
than a vehicle for the vindication of the value interests of concerned
bystanders." 293 Administrative process and litigation over that process
should not replace legislative or administrative choice.
In a world of unintended consequences, opening the door to speakers
does not guarantee their voices are meaningful to debate. Too much
information can become counterproductive. Participants in the creation of
guidance or litigants over that guidance can usurp courts in a "kind of private
conscription of public resources . . . that undermines a fully democratic
efforts . . . to allocate . . . limited [agency] resources to the most serious
problems." 2 94 Perhaps unknowingly, tax has experimented with filtering
information, both through its process of creating guidance and through limits
on pre-enforcement litigation. Rather than ignore the concern of information
capture, agencies should be encouraged in the endeavor to find constructive
ways to filter information.
B. Reasonable Heuristics
Capture is a particular problem in the tax system because, while the
Internal Revenue Code is a complex statute, the Code fails to answer every
question or provide guidance for every scenario. Because of its combination
of complexity and incompleteness, Congress must vest significant discretion
in the Treasury Department to administer the tax system.295 How the
293 United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S. 669,
687 (1973). Moreover, requirements of particularized, concrete injuries are not as stringent as
they used to be. Cass Sunstein, Informational Regulation and Informational Standing, 147 U.
PA. L. REv. 613, 672 (1999); Gene Nichol, Jr., Abusing Standing, 133 U. PA. L. REv. 635, 657
(1985).
294 Jackel, supra note 41.
295 See the power of I.R.C. § 7805(a).
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Treasury Department should exercise that discretion is part of the underlying
debate over the process for creating tax guidance. By requiring increased
process in the creation of guidance, the courts risk limiting guidance to an ex
ante consideration of abstract facts rather than also permitting the ex post
evaluation of taxpayers' own facts and circumstances with an evolving sense
of the law. Instead of following current criticism, the agency should move in
the opposite direction and create more first principles that can be imposed as
best determined by the agency trusted to administer the law.
There are many ways to exercise the discretion vested in the Treasury
Department. Complex regulations that spell out any eventuality before the
law becomes effective are one method, arguably as unlikely to be complete
as the statute that necessitated guidance. Alternatively, the agency could
create reasonable heuristics that guide policy choice and, armed with these
rules of thumb, the agency then determines the application of the statute on a
case-by-case basis. Tax needs a combination of these two approaches. Even
if there were no issue of ossification or any cost of notice and comment, there
remains a benefit from an agency's ability to nimbly respond to changes in
its governing statute and in regulated behavior. That nimbleness in agency
discretion should be constrained by fundamental heuristics of tax policy.
Heuristics are strategies or tools that require little information to make
complicated decisions. Streamlining the process of decision-making, these
rules of thumb or first principles make choices easier and more effective.
Thus, they provide a framework for making satisfactory decisions quickly. 296
The goal of a good heuristic is to reduce the effort needed to make a decision
by providing mental shortcuts. When applied on a system-wide basis,
heuristics can permit the transmission of information to groups in the form
of easier to apply rules that permit non-experts to participate. 297
The value of nimbleness might seem surprising in a highly specialized
area of law based on seemingly endless statutes. However, as the government
and the public interact over the income tax, they are interacting over the most
complicated and difficult of taxes. The tax places a: premium on sensitivity
to economic changes and to public attitudes. It demands high technical skills
on the part of those who shape the legislative structure, who administer and
interpret its provisions, who advise the public how to order its business and
family affairs under the tax. It requires a literate citizenry with a respect for
law and a willingness to shoulder fiscal burdens.298
296 Anuj Shah & Daniel Oppenheimer, Heuristics Made Easy, 134 PSYCHOL. BULL. 207
(2008).
297 Marta Berbes-Blazquez & Mathieu Feagan, The Need for Heuristics in Ecosystem
Approaches to Health, II EcoHEALTH 290 (2014).




This creates an ideal situation for the government's employment of
heuristics because of a widespread acceptance that there are special rules that
must be learned but also a need to make the rules comprehensible by the
public.
The sheer complexity of the law requires administrative flexibility.
Several specialized tax statutes are enacted annually, which makes it almost
impossible to build a system on exhaustive regulations expected to cover all
scenarios. Additionally, taxpayers respond to the law (and changes to the
law) as they attempt to minimize their tax burdens. The agency tasked with
administering the tax system cannot anticipate all legal changes and
taxpayers' responses. The agency needs to be able to respond to changes as
they occur. Even while seeking to broaden standing for tax litigation, in one
dissenting opinion, Justice John Paul Stevens wrote, "The Executive requires
latitude to decide how best to enforce the law, and in general the Court may
well be correct that the exercise of that discretion, especially in the tax
context, is unchallengable."2 9 9
The trend toward short-term legislation with sunset provisions only
increases the need for heuristics and more rapidly issued tax guidance.300 The
Treasury Department may find it difficult to issue even temporary guidance
for an already effective tax break that will shortly expire. To require notice
and comment would render the issuance impossible. This would mean
guidance is likely never issued for an increasing number of tax provisions.
Because the audit rate is low, most users of any given tax benefit will never
be challenged, and case law may never develop to guide taxpayers. Cases of
those few who are audited take time to move through the courts and so case
law, limited as it is, might not develop until after the provision has expired.
And these provisions, hastily written and often with the intent of changing
behavior or meeting specific goals, may be the most in need of explication in
order to be effective.
The creation of tax-specific heuristics is one means the agency has of
guiding decision-making in a more flexible way than through the ex ante
exercise of discretion in exhaustive regulations that wind their way through
notice and comment. When required to make complicated decisions in order
to comply with a complicated statute such as the Internal Revenue Code,
people face psychological and behavioral barriers to making good
decisions 30 1: "The central fact of our existence is that time is the ultimate
299 Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 793 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
300 See Victor Fleischer, Tax Extenders, 67 TAx L. REV. 613 (2014); Rebecca Kysar, The
Sun Also Rises, 40 GA. L. REV. 335 (2006); Jason Oh, The Pivotal Politics of Temporary
Legislation, 100 IOWA L. REV. 1055 (2015); Manoj Viswanathan, Sunset Provisions in the Tax
Code, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. (2007).
301 See generally Antoinette Schoar, The Power ofHeuristics, 42 IDEAs 2 (2014); DANIEL
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,,302finite resource . . . . The use of heuristics makes it more likely that
taxpayers and tax officials will make good decisions because simple
information through rules of thumb is more easily absorbed and recalled. 30 3
People use heuristics as indispensible psychological tools in all facets of
their lives, and the tax system should be based on that reality. We know that
taxpayers already utilize their own heuristics in understanding the tax system.
Professors Edward McCaffery and Jonathan Baron observe systematic
cognitive biases in a series of experiments involving tax and financial
decision-making.304 Despite not always being accurate, subjects' heuristics
influenced their behavior. This finding has been found many times and
305
neither education nor work experience alters the result. Even managers
base financial decisions on salient information, such as average tax rates,
rather than more accurate but less accessible information, such as marginal
tax rates.306 Thus, taxpayers already have rules of thumb in assessing the tax
system but the rules they use are not always the best.
If even experienced and educated professionals have need of heuristics,
the need is particularly great for those with low levels of financial (and hence
tax) literacy. A growing body of literature documents the low levels of
financial literacy in the general population and its impact on decision making.
Especially those with low levels of education, women, and ethnic minorities
experience widespread lack of financial literacy, and this lack of literacy is,
in turn, associated with poor financial decision-making.307 This likely
KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLow (2011).
302 KAHNEMAN,supra note 301, at 409.
303 Schoar, supra note 301.
304 Edward McCaffery & Jonathan Baron, The Humptv Dumpty Blues, 91 ORG. BEHAV.
& HuM. DECISION PROCESSES 230 (2003); Edward McCaffery & Jonathan Baron, Framing
and Taxation, 25 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 679 (2004).
305 See Harold Amberger et al., Heuristics and Tax Planning: Evidence From a
Laboratory Experiment (2015) (draft version), https://www.sbs.ox.ac.uk/sites/default
/files/BusinessTaxation/Events/conferences/2015/Doctoralmtg_2015/amberger-paper.pdf;
see also Kay Balufus et al., Decision Heuristics and Tax Perception, 35 J. EcoN. PSYCHOL. I
(2013); Alejandro Drexler et al., Keeping It Simple, 6 AM. ECON. J. 1 (2014); John Scholz &
Neil Pinney, Duty, Fear, and Tax Compliance, 39 AM. J. POL. Sci. 490 (1995); Michael Spicer
& Rodney Hero, Tax Evasion and Heuristics, 26 J. PuB. EcoN. 263 (1985); John Graham et
al., Tax Rates and Corporate Decision Making (Working Paper, 2014).
306 Graham et al., supra note 305; Schoar, supra note 301, at 4; Claudia Townsend &
Suzanne Shu, When and How Aesthetics Influences Financial Decisions, 20 J. of CONSUMER
PSYCHOL. 452 (2010).
307 Annamaria Lusardi & Olivia Mitchell, Planning and Financial Literacy, 98 AM.
ECON. REv. 413 (2008); Annamaria Lusardi & Olivia Mitchell, Financial Literacy and
Retirement Preparedness, 42 Bus. ECON. 35 (2007); van Rooij et al., Financial Literacy and
Stock Market Participation, 101 J. FIN. ECON. 449 (2011); Victor Stango & Jonathan Zinman,
Exponential Growth Bias and Household Finance, 64 J. FIN. 2807 (2009).
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impacts their tax compliance. Easing compliance by recognizing the
importance of heuristics should improve administration of the tax system.
Heuristics are only one of many tools being used by taxpayers and tax
officials in addition to written guidance. With respect to taxes, as with other
complicated choices, people are influenced by past experience, cognitive
biases, age, and belief in their own personal relevance.308 Creating
complicated written guidance following dense notice and comment
procedures is unlikely to supplant other, easier means of decision-making by
all but those most adept at tax law. Recognizing these tools permits
policymakers to create better guidance that fosters compliance with the
underlying statute.
This knowledge of how people understand tax should shape the
acceptability of tax guidance. Tax guidance does not have to be all-inclusive.
Except for the most aggressive tax planners and their representatives, those
who currently seek more guidance are not necessarily seeking the ex ante
application of the statute to all facts.309 Heuristics, as another form of
guidance, enables agencies and their employees to be more accurate,
consistent, and predictable. Moreover, heuristics permit taxpayers to
determine for themselves the applicability of the law, which, in turn,
conserves agency resources both by limiting taxpayer inquiries about the law
in particular circumstances and deterring conduct that triggers audits and
subsequent litigation.310 Because guidance can come in many forms, those
that are the most accessible to taxpayers are likely best able to achieve its
objectives.
As alluded to in the prior paragraph, those engaged in aggressive tax
planning and the creation of tax shelters are likely unhappy with the use of
heuristics. These rules of thumb permit the agency to use discretion to ensure
compliance with the spirit of the law rather than being limited to an
evaluation of a taxpayer's deft maneuvering around specific lines in
regulations. Because planners can most effectively structure deals around
clearly demarcated lists and requirements, it is likely they would push for
their creation in the notice and comment process. If the agency sought to
308 See Wandi de Bruin et al., Individual Differences in Adult Decision-Making
Competence, 92 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 938 (2007); Nicholas Epley & Thomas
Gilovich, The Anchoring-and-Adjustment Heuristic, 17 PSYCHOL. Sci. 311 (2006); Daniel
Golstein & Gerd Gigerenzer, Models ofEcological Rationality, 109 PSYCHOL. REv. 75 (2002);
Keith Stanovich & Richard West, On the Relative Independence of Thinking Biases and
Cognitive Ability, 94 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 672 (2008); Richard West et al.,
Heuristics and Biases as Measures of Critical Thinking, 100 J. EDuc. PSYCHOL. 930 (2008).
309 See Transcript Available of Tax Analysts' Roundtable on 'Taxes and the Guidance
Problem,' 2011 TNT 142-100 (Jul. 22, 2011).
310 Jessica Mantel, Procedural Safeguards for Agency Guidance, 61 ADMIN. L. REv. 343,
393 (2009).
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maintain heuristics following notice and comment, it would need to build a
strong defense for the inevitable litigation and an explanation why these types
of rules are necessary and the proposed lists inadequate.
The federal income tax currently operates with numerous heuristics that
would likely be challenged in a system with regimented procedure because
they were not developed through that process. Developed through common
law and now incorporated into practice by the Service, tax lawyers know that
gross income is interpreted broadly while deductions are construed narrowly
.311 - 312
as a matter of legislative grace, income is to be taxed to earners,
substance prevails over form, 3 13 and (although possibly threatened by
codification) transactions need economic substance.314 These ideas, among
others, guide the practice of law and the choices taxpayers make when they
report the tax consequences of their activities. Without such guideposts,
every new tax provision must be fully and singularly explicated, and any
ambiguity litigated from scratch.
Those within the field of taxation are likely to know these, and other, tax
heuristics. Because of technicalities pervading the field of tax, subject matter
specialization is pervasive.: The difficulty of remaining up-to-date on tax
developments means that most tax practitioners have little time for broader
research.316 The need for deep knowledge in this one area may preclude all
but cursory knowledge of others, but the need for specialization is one reason
heuristics are particularly useful and could be standardized to aid more
taxpayers, advisors, and Service employees.
A legitimate concern is that people come to tax with diverse experiences
and expertise. These differences might cause people to initially apply
different heuristics. It is for this reason that the system should work on
disseminating workable heuristics rather than increasing procedural
requirements for increasingly detailed rules. In other words, as the Treasury
Department develops its first principles, it should work to make them known
more widely.
As shown by the government's efforts during World War II, it is possible
311 Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955) (holding that
"undeniable accessions to wealth, clearly realized, and over which the taxpayers have
complete dominion" are taxable as gross income); United States v. Wells Fargo Bank, 485
U.S. 351, 354 (1988) (noting that "exemptions from taxation are not to be imposed; they must
be unambiguously proved."); Knight v. Commissioner, 128 S.Ct. 782, 790 (2008) (stating that
"an income tax deduction is a matter of legislative grace").
312 Commissioner v. Banks, 543 U.S. 426,433-34 (2005).
313 Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
314 Id.
315 See Zelenak, supra note 1, at 1912 (mentioning the number of cases).
316 Id.
317 See Berbes-Blazquez & Mathieu Feagan, supra note 297.
2016]1 607
608 Virginia Tax Review [Vol. 35:553
to popularize tax heuristics. Professor Carolyn Jones illustrates the process
the Treasury Department adopted to transition the income tax into a mass-tax
with a "new culture of taxpaying." 3 18 Adoption of popular culture tools,
including songs and cartoons, were a tool to spread the message of one's tax
responsibilities. Donald Duck even provided instructions on how to comply
with the income tax, such as stating "Don't guess, it will solve a lot of trouble
if you get it right." 3 19 Currently, the Service focuses on creating heuristics
regarding audit probabilities, tax penalties, and enforcement efficacy.320 The
government has, and can, create general rules for taxpayers to apply, but
those heuristics rarely have completed notice and comment.
The practical reliance on heuristics may help explain why so few
practitioners raise claims of failed procedure in the creation of tax
guidance.321 If most taxpayers rely on heuristics only supplemented with
technical guidance, taxpayers may accept guidance when it is consistent with
their heuristics without questioning the procedure used for the guidance's
creation. It is beyond the scope of this article to determine whether the
number of such challenges has increased and, if so, whether this is a statement
regarding the efficacy of existing tax heuristics. Anecdotally, as discussed in
part III, attacks on guidance on procedural grounds appears to have increased
but possibly more from the perception these attacks are a means for
individualized tax reduction rather than a claim that the rules were
unreasonable or unexpected.
Valuing heuristics as a form of guidance does not mean that more
detailed guidance is unimportant. Such guidance may be necessary when
heuristics are insufficient. The long-standing debate over the merits of rules
versus standards is not to be resolved in this article.322 When particular
guidance is necessary, the procedures behind its creation can have a
legitimizing effect, and in some cases parties are more satisfied with results
they perceive to be procedurally fair, even when the results are
318 Carolyn Jones, Mass-Based Income Taxation, in FUNDING THE MODERN AMERICAN
STATE, 1941-1995, at 107-08 (W. Elliot Brownlee ed., 1996); Carolyn Jones, Class Tax to
Mass Tax, 37 BUFF. L. REv. 685 (1989).
319 DISNEY, A NEW SPIRIT, https://archive.org/details/TheNewSpirit (1942); see also
DISNEY, PAY YOUR INCOME TAX, https://archive.org/details/TheSpiritOf43 56 (1943).
320 Joshua Blank & Daniel Levin, When Is Tax Enforcement Publicized?, 30 VA. TAX
REV. 1, 5 (2010).
321 Hickman, Coloring Outside the Lines, supra note 27, at 1731; see also Hosp. Corp.
of Am. & Subsidiaries v. Commissioner, 348 F.3d 136, 146 n.3 (6th Cir. 2003) (noting that
taxpayers are not making procedural challenges).
322 See generally RICHARD EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD (1995); Colin
Diver, The Optimal Precision ofAdministrative Rules, 93 YALE L. J. 65 (1983); Ezra Friedman
& Abraham Wickelgren, A New Angle on Rules Versus Standards, 16 AM. L. & ECON. REV.
499 (2014); Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards, 42 DuKE L. J. 557 (1992).
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unfavorable.323 Thus, procedure may make guidance more acceptable to
taxpayers. On the other hand, procedure and ex ante rules can determine
outcomes regardless of the merits of the case.324
It is enough to say that the hard and fast rules likely to be pushed through
notice and comment are not always most just based on the particular facts of
a particular case. At times, discretion can best be exercised after the facts are
known. When all discretion is exercised ex ante, part of agencies' expertise
may be underutilized and the agency loses its nimble ability to respond to
changes in the law and taxpayer behavior. With reasonable heuristics, it is
possible to defer to agency discretion with a reasonable judicial backstop.
The fear of heuristics and of agency discretion necessitates hard and fast
rules that are nearly as easily made in Congress as in the specialized agency.
Consider, for example, the taxation of fringe benefits in the 1970s. The
Treasury Department exercised its discretion regarding their taxation through
proposed regulations, circulated in draft rather than proposed form because
the agency desired "the broadest possible public comment." 325 Faced with
numerous critics, the agency withdrew this proposed language. 326
Furthermore, Congress enacted a statute imposing a moratorium on new
regulations.327 A congressional task force then studied the issue, and
Congress passed legislation governing fringe benefits in 1984. m The need
for detailed ex ante rules was as easily made by Congress as in the Treasury
Department, but this limited the Service's ability to resolve particular cases
based on its experience with claims for fringe benefits. This reallocation of
responsibility back to Congress might be the correct answer in this instance,
323 See Paul G. Chevigny, Fairness and Participation, 64 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1211, 1217-
23(1989).
324 See Herra v. Collings, 506 U.S. 390, 411 (1993) (rejecting untimely claim that newly
discovered evidence that exonerated defendant was sufficient to obtain relief); Coleman v.
Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 757 (1991) (rejecting claim of attorney error because no right to
counsel and failure to make proper federal habeas appeal); Schiavone v. Fortune, 477 U.S. 21,
29 (1986) (dismissing libel claim because statute of limitations expired because complaint
listed incorrect defendant); Nat'l Hockey League v. Metro. Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639,
643 (1976) (issuing sanction of dismissal for noncompliance with discovery).
325 Fringe Benefits: Notice of Publication of Discussion Draft of Regulations, 40 Fed.
Reg. 41,118-19 (proposed Sept. 25, 1975); Fringe Benefits: Withdrawal of Discussion Draft
of Proposed Regulations, 41 Fed. Reg. 56,334 (Dec. 28, 1976).
326 Fringe Benefits: Withdrawal of Discussion Draft of Proposed Regulations, 41 Fed.
Reg. 56,334 (Dec. 28, 1976).
327 Act of Oct. 7, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-427, 92 Stat. 996; see also Act of Dec. 29, 1979,
Pub. L. No.
96-167, 93 Stat. 1275 (extending moratorium through May 31, 1981).
328 See generally Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 531, 98 Stat. 494,




but it does dismiss the value of the agency's expertise.
If courts fear agency discretion to the degree that they necessitate ex ante
exercise of it in the detailed and formulistic way likely to survive the notice
and comment process, Congress should remove discretion entirely by
changing the statute and congressional expectations of the agency. Consider
the current regulations governing innocent spouse relief discussed earlier.
The new regulations define how discretion is to be exercised for each
potential claimant and how relief operates in all circumstances with an
expectation of the need to withstand hard look review. The result is that there
is no benefit of human evaluation of the applicant by agency personnel.
Formulaic determinations of need and abuse replace an evaluation of honesty
and circumstance. Moreover, in the creation of these regulations, the agency
no longer administers the law but has become a mini-legislature for times
when Congress failed to legislate fully.
There is a risk the nation is moving away from heuristics in tax with the
codification movement and the move to increased APA procedures. For
example, Congress codified the judicially created economic substance
doctrine in March 2010.329 The heuristic demanded transactions have
economic substance beyond tax savings in order for their tax effects to be
respected. The issue of the codification of this rule was debated long before
its enactment, and it remains unclear how far this provision moves the law
from its heuristic start. Unlike the heuristic, the statute contains a two-prong
mechanical test to determine whether economic substance exists. Therefore,
it is likely codification will limit the flexibility of the doctrine as applied by
the courts.330
The Treasury Department has proven unwilling to venture through
notice and comment with rules implementing the statutory economic
substance doctrine, although the Service has created less formal guidance.
Because the doctrine "poses open-ended and unanswerable questions," 331it
is doubtful the agency can create acceptable ex ante regulations as required
by the APA to implement this rule. Concerns that it was "patently unfair" to
apply the new codified provision without significant guidance as to how it
should be applied necessitated some guidance but the format the Service has
chosen has little authority but does provide much needed information to
329 Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, § 1409,
124 Stat. 1029, 1067 (2010) (codified at I.R.C. § 7701(o)).
330 Nomination of Pamela Olson, Hearing Before the Senate Finance Committee (2002)
(statement of Pamela Olson, Assistant Secretary of Treasury, Tax Policy); Dennis Ventry,
Save the Economic Substance Doctrine from Congress, TAX NOTEs 1405, 1411 (Mar. 31,
2008).
33 Joseph Bankman, The Economic Substance Doctrine, 74 S. CAL. L. REv. 5, 29 (2000);
see also Sheryl Stratton, Shelter Disclosure, Doctrine Codification Debated, 2003 TNT 61-3
(Apr. 7, 2003).
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taxpayers.33
In the face of a daunting notice and comment process, the Service has
chosen to offer what is, in effect, its own nullification of the codified
economic substance doctrine. After a brief interpretation of the new
provision, the Service stated it would issue no guidance but requested
comments as to disclosure requirements to avoid the provision's heightened
penalties.m Within six months, a directive was publicly issued that provided
high level officials must approve any proposal to impose the codified
economic substance doctrine and related penalties to ensure consistent
administration. 334 A second directive ten months later made public a series
of inquiries that a Service employee must develop and analyze before seeking
approval to raise the codified economic substance doctrine.335 A little more
than a year later, the Service provided more basic, and still informal, guidance
as to how this new statutory provision would be applied.336 Outside of formal
procedure, the Service has made sure the public understands its position even
if, in doing so, it fails to adopt the regime changes likely envisioned by those
who wanted a more regimented law. Only time will tell whether this result
terminates the heuristic underlying the statutory provision.
Perhaps more troubling than the threat to any particular tax heuristic is
that the current criticism of tax exceptionalism may threaten tax's most basic
heuristic, the understanding that tax is somehow different. Although a
detailed discussion of this phenomenon must wait for another article, this rule
of thumb allows practitioners and the government to limit the amount of
information that they are accountable for knowing. It is possible that the
increase in information that would result from breaking down the silo around
taxation would further exacerbate the isolation of tax. This new tax order
would demand (1) the continued understanding of tax specific rules (although
less guidance is likely to be issued), plus (2) a newfound understanding of
how those rules interact with other areas of the law. Few, perhaps many
fewer, attorneys and advisors could hope to attain a working level of
information in this un-siloed world.
Furthermore, the practical threat of eliminating this heuristic that tax is
different might be particularly damaging for the government. In an
environment where people do not want to pay taxes, this heuristic of
332 Jackel Monte, Subchapter K and the Codified Economic Substance Doctrine, 2010
TNT 138-4 (July 20, 2010); see also Jeremiah Coder, Treasuy Official Reiterates Limited
Scope ofEconomic Substance Guidance, 2010 TNT 118-2 (June 28, 2010). But see Bret Wells,
Economic Substance Doctrine, 10 FLA. TAX REV. 411 (2010).
3 I.R.S. Notice 2010-62, 2010-40 C.B. 411.
334 I.R.S. Treas. Dir. LMSB-04-0910-024 (Sept. 14, 2010).
33 I.R.S. Treas. Dir. LB&I-04-0711-015 (July 15, 2011).




different-ness can work for the government by limiting the procedures it must
follow but also against the government by limiting the Service's budget and
the regard in which its employees are held. To remove one part of the
heuristic, a certain deference society gives to the operation of the tax system,
without removing the other, resulting in a limited budget and widespread
antagonism, would likely be catastrophic to raising revenue.
The likelihood that this threat would be outweighed by finding answers
to taxing problems in other areas of law is remote. Encouraging the cross-
pollination of ideas is beneficial only if doing so improves the chances the
Treasury Department properly implements the tax law. Unfortunately,
because it is impossible to know the availability of answers ex ante, it is
impossible to know whether there would be sufficient benefit to outweigh the
costs.
Thus, although taxpayers are proven to use heuristics when making their
decisions regarding taxes, tax critics are reluctant to empower the agency to
craft heuristics or to admit that these are often the basis of decisions. Instead
of limiting agency power through extensive ex ante exercises of discretion in
processes that can withstand the scrutiny of hard look review, when Congress
desires to delegate discretion it should be delegated in a way that maximizes
congressional objectives. It is the objectives that should drive the design of
tax guidance, rather than a fear of agency power.
V. CONCLUSION
The exceptionalness of the tax system is an issue of degree and not of
kind. The tax system is not better or worse or more important than other fields
of law. It may or may not be more complicated. As with many other parts of
our federal system, the tax system has a unique history and that difference
has long-term consequences that cannot simply be undone. Ignoring that past
or the different processes that have developed "runs the risk . . . of
downplaying the virtues of pragmatism, flexibility, and realism." 337 We must
be careful before we eliminate strengths our tax system is built upon.
This is not to suggest the Treasury Department's operation of the federal
income tax is perfect. Nonetheless, it does do some things right, such as walk
the line with information capture and struggling to define workable heuristics
for taxpayers and its employees. These processes should be encouraged. Most
certainly these attempts should not be ignored or jettisoned in the guise of
eliminating tax exceptionalism.
Moreover, the tax system's exceptional processes should be made
available to other agencies for review. As a kind of laboratory of
m Richard Murphy, Pragmatic Administrative Law and Tax Exceptionalism, 64 DUKE
L. J. ONLINE 21, 21 (2014).
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administrative law experimentation, in much the same way that states operate
within a federalist system, tax law exceptionalism can foster innovation or
contain the spread of bad procedure. Current proposals to dismantle the
exceptionalism surrounding the creation of tax guidance risks increasing
information for its own sake without improving tax guidance and possibly
leading to the capture of the tax administration. Before the courts impose
requirements on the Treasury Department for the sake of doing so, there
needs to be more comparative work with other agencies and a recognition
that the APA's procedure, even in the abstract, is not without faults.

